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JURISDICTION 
The Court has original jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102 to 
answer questions of State law certified by the Courts of the United States. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The District Court certified two questions for Appellate Review. The 
issues were preserved for appeal by the proceedings before the United States 
District Court as reflected in the order of the court. The order is attached as 
Exhibit A in the Appendix. 
1. Is Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6(3) constitutional? 
2. Does Utah recognize Restatement (3d) of Torts: Products Liability §16 
(b)-(d). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following Constitutional Provisions apply; Article 5, Article 6, Section 
1, 22, and 24. The following Statutes apply; Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102, §78-
15-3, and §78-15-6(3). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The underlying facts of the accident in issue are fully set out in Egbert v. 
Nissan, 167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 2007) The case is attached as Exhibit B in the 
Appendix. The instant appeal concerns two questions of law which the Court did 
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not consider in Egbert L The first is the constitutional challenge to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-15-6. The factual background to the Constitutional question concerning 
the validity of Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6 is folly set out in the Court's opinion in 
Egbert I at footnote three. See Egbert v. Nisan, 167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 2007). The 
second question concerns the applicability of Restatement (3d) of Torts: Products 
Liability §16 (c) which provides that in cases of crashworthiness where damages 
cannot be attributed to one cause or the other, the known tortfeasor is responsible 
for both. Attached as Exhibit C is the Restatement with its commentary. The 
contentions of the parties as to Restatement (3d) of Torts: Products Liability §16 
(c) are referenced in the opinion and no further facts are necessary to explain this 
controversy. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A. The Supreme Court declared Utah Code Ann. §78-15-3 unconstitutional in 
Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp,, 111 P.2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985) because it contained 
a statute of repose that had the effect of destroying a cause of action before it even 
arose. At the same time, the Court declared other sections including Utah Code 
Ann. §78-15-6 unconstitutional because they could not be severed from §78-15-3. 
Although the Legislature repealed and re-enacted §78-15-3, changing it to a statute 
of limitations rather, than a statute of repose, the Legislature did not do the same 
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with §78-15-6. The Legislature has not reenacted amended or otherwise dealt 
with §78-15-6. 
Having declared the section unconstitutional, it is the prerogative of the 
legislature under Article 5 of the Utah State Constitution to repeal, re-enact or 
otherwise deal with the section. It is not the Court's province under the State 
Constitution to re-enact the section regardless of the Court's view of the wisdom 
of continuing the Statute. 
B. The Restatement 3rd of Torts: Products Liability § 16(c) provides that in 
cases of enhanced injury, where the damages may not be apportioned between 
causes, the known tortfeasor should bear the burden of uncertainty. The 
Restatement states the majority view and also supported by Utah law in Tingey v. 
Christensen, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999). Accordingly, the District Court's 
question as to Restatement section (c) should be answered in the affirmative. 
Subsection (b) merely states the common sense rule that if proof supports a 
determination of the harm that would have resulted from other causes in the 
absence of the product defect, the product seller's liability is limited to the 
increased harm attributable solely to the product defect. Likewise section (d) 
would apply the rules of joint and several liability applicable under appropriate 
state law. These two sections which appear uncontroversial were added to the 
District Court's Certification Order at the behest of Nissan. 
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It is subsection (c) which is and remains the center of this controversy. 
Accordingly, Appellants devote their briefing to the issues raised by subsection 
(c). 
ARGUMENT 
A. §78-15-6(3) remains unconstitutional. 
The determination of whether government standards should dictate defect 
in a products liability suit is left to the legislature. The precise question before the 
Court concerns the effect of the legislature's re-enactment of §78-15-3, changing 
that section from a statute of repose to a statute of limitation. This action should 
not affect the status of §78-15-6 (which provides product liability standards). 
Section Six was also declared unconstitutional by the Court in Berry. The 
reenactment of Section Three of the Products Liability Act addressed the Court's 
concern over statutes of repose expressed in Berry. However, the legislature's 
failure to address the governmental standards imposed by Section Six of the 
products liability act is troublesome and renders it invalid. 
There are only two possible bases for the Court resurrecting Section Six. 
First, it could be decided that the legislature impliedly reenacted Section Six by 
reenacting Section Three. Second, this Court could decide that the legislature 
intended to resurrect Section Six by implication. Neither position is tenable under 
provisions of the Utah State Constitution. 
While the Egberts could find no cases resurrecting legislation declared 
unconstitutional by implication, it is clear from the Utah Constitution that 
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legislation may not be passed without deliberate and conscious action. For 
example, Article 6 Section 1 of the Constitution provides that the legislative power 
of the people of the State rests in the House and in the Senate. 
Article Six Section 24 of the Constitution provides that the presiding officer 
of each house shall sign all bills passed by the legislature certifying to their 
accuracy and authenticity as enacted by the legislature. The purpose of the 
constitutional section requiring such signature is to give accuracy and authenticity 
to the legislation. See Dean v. Rampton, 583 P.2d 169 (1975). In this case, no 
officer of the legislature signed an acknowledgment of a bill reenacting Section 
Six. It would therefore violate the Constitution to ignore the requirement to obtain 
such signatures given the fact that the legislature has chosen to be silent on this 
subject. Likewise, implied reenactment would violate Article 6 Section 22 of the 
Constitution which requires every bill to be read three separate times in each 
house of the legislature. 
More importantly, the Court cannot and should not attempt to read intent 
into the Legislature's failure to adopt Section Six when it amended Section Three. 
It is as likely that the legislature intended to do nothing as to make some 
affirmative decision by its silence. It has been twenty-four years since Berry and 
the legislature has done nothing to repeal, amend, reenact or adopt Section Six. 
This legislative silence should be respected. 
Having declared the Section unconstitutional, this Court should not invade 
the legislature's prerogative to address the problem by legislation. Indeed, this 
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Court has no ability to read the collective minds of the members of the House and 
Senate. Such action would violate the Distribution of Powers found in Article 5 of 
the Constitution. There, the judicial branch is precluded from exercising any 
function appertaining to the Legislature. While there appears to be no cases 
concerning the separation of powers in a controversy over implied reenactment, it 
appears clear that if the legislature could not pass a bill outside of the confines of 
regular business, the Court should not either. The legislature has not delegated to 
the Court the task of reenacting Section Six. The Court should not allow the 
legislature to abrogate its' responsibilities. This Court should never put itself in a 
position of guessing as to the silent unexpressed intent of a legislative body. 
The reenactment of a statute setting standards for products liability is 
particularly reserved to the legislature as a political question. Judge Orme 
explained this doctrine in Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1995). 
The political question doctrine, rooted in the United States 
Constitution's separation of powers premise, prevents judicial 
interference in matters wholly within the control and discretion of 
other branches of government. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
210-11, 82 S. Ct. 691,706, 7 L.Ed.2d663 (1962); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
Preventing such intervention preserves the integrity of functions 
lawfully delegated to political branches of the government and 
avoids undue judicial involvement in specialized operations in which 
the courts may have little knowledge and competence. 
Id. at 541. Judge Orme further notes that the political question doctrine is 
equally applicable to prevent interference by Utah state courts into the powers 
granted to the executive and legislative branches of our state and local 
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governments. Courts must hold "strictly to an exercise and expression of their 
delegated or innate power to interpret and adjudicate." Skokos v. Corradini, 900 
P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1995), citing Trade Coram, 's v. Skaggs Drug Ctrs Inc., 21 
Utah 2d 431,439, 456 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1968). 
It is clear that under the political question doctrine, the Court has no 
mandate to do that which the legislature has failed to do for nearly a quarter 
century. Nissan may argue that Berry was wrongfully decided, but overruling 
Berry to resurrect a statute which the legislature has ignored itself violates the 
political questions doctrine. Accordingly, the Court should exercise judicial 
restraint and allow the legislature, which is the proper constitutional body to set 
legislative limits on Utah products liability law, to deal with this matter. 
B. The Burden of Proof under Restatement (3d) of Torts: Products Liability 
§16 (c) is appropriately on Defendant. 
In Egbert /, the Court decided that an instruction patterned on Restatement 
(3d) of Torts: Products Liability 16 (a) was appropriate. Therefore, under settled 
law where a product is defective at the time of the commercial sale or other 
distribution and the defect is a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiffs harm 
beyond that which would have resulted from other causes, the product seller is 
liable for the increased harm. If the parties are able to prove the damages which 
could have been expected as a result of the original rollover, this case comes under 
(b) of the Restatement which provides in pertinent portion that if proof supports a 
determination of the harm that would have resulted from other causes, the seller's 
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liability is limited to the increased harm attributable solely to the product defect. 
As noted above, this proposition is uncontroversial. 
The controversy arises when the jury is not able to apportion damages 
between the preexisting accident and the subsequent harm arising as a result of the 
manufacturer's product. This is the situation covered by subsection (c). "If proof 
does not support a determination under subsection (b) of the harm that would have 
resulted in the absence of the product defect, the product seller is liable for all of 
the plaintiffs harm attributable to the defect and other causes." 
Subsection (c) is nothing more than an application of Summers v. Tice, 199 
P.2d 1 (Cal.1948). There, concurrent tortfeasors simultaneously caused injury to 
plaintiff. Plaintiff could not prove which of the guilty parties caused the injury. 
Rather than casting the burden on the innocent plaintiff, the Court placed the 
burden of exculpating himself upon each defendant. The only difference between 
this situation and Summers is that the tortfeasors acted concurrently instead of 
simultaneously. The rule Nissan urges places the burden of loss upon an innocent 
plaintiff rather than on an admitted tortfeasor whose actions contributed to the 
loss. This rule is unjust because it allows a tortfeasor to escape liability for its 
negligent actions simply because the injured plaintiff can not demonstrate the 
amount of damage which she would have otherwise suffered. 
This Court has adopted the Restatement position. In Tingey v. Christensen, 
987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999), the Court stated: "We hold that if the jury can 
find a reasonable basis for apportioning damages between a preexisting condition 
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and a subsequent tort, it should do so; however, if the jury finds it impossible to 
apportion damages, it should find that the tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount 
of damages." The rational in Tingey was that the tortfeasor takes the victim as it 
finds her. A tortfeasor should bear the burden of uncertainty in the amount of the 
tort victim's damages. Lastly, the defendant should not escape liability because 
the amount of damages cannot be proved with precision. The Utah Appeals Court 
reiterated these principles in Renegade Oil v. Progressive Cas. Ins, Co., 101 P.3d 
383, 386 (Utah App. 2004) "After all [it is] the wrongdoer, rather than the injured 
party, who should bear the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages." 
Here, the prior crash is nothing more than a preexisting condition and the lack of 
crashworthiness a subsequent tort. Thus, this Court and the Court of Appeals 
advocate the Restatement position. Nissan's arguments to the contrary should not 
disturb settled Utah law. 
Nissan has claimed that the Restatement improperly shifts the burden of 
proof. This is not true. The plaintiff retains the burden of proving defect and 
increased harm. "Proof of defect does not, of itself, establish a case of increased 
harm. The plaintiff must also establish that the defect was a substantial factor in 
increasing the plaintiffs harm beyond that which would have occurred from other 
causes." Restatement (3d) of Torts: Products Liability 16 comment b. All 
Subsection (c) accomplishes is that when proof does not support an allocation of 
damages between the prior crash and the defective car, the manufacturer is 
responsible for all damages. This is in accordance with settled principles 
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including Utah law. However, this determination does not occur until the 
plaintiff demonstrates by competent testimony that the plaintiffs harm was 
increased as a result of the product defect. Restatement (3d) of Torts: Products 
Liability comment (b). 
A strong majority of courts that have considered the question have adopted 
a rule that supports Subsection 16(c). The majority rule is known as the Fox-
Mitchell approach. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 
1982). The Restatement position places the entire burden of damages upon the 
known tortfeasor when allocation cannot be made. This rule is supported by the 
courts of at least twenty-three states. The opposing view, which denies plaintiff 
any recovery if the plaintiff cannot allocate damages, is known as the Huddell 
approach. Huddell is followed by fewer than six states. Even New Jersey, the 
state whose federal court decided Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976) 
may end up in the Fox-Mitchell camp. In Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 
A.2d 966, 980 n. 1 (NJ.Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), the court noted that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court had not yet decided whether a plaintiff or defendant has the 
burden of apportionment in a crashworthiness case. The court then noted "a rule 
placing upon the defendant the burden of proof with respect to the apportionment 
of damages, may be more in line with our Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Scafidi v. Seller, 574 A.2d 398 (N.J. 1990)." The New Jersey intermediate court 
reiterated this position in Reichart v. Vegholm, 840 A.2d 942, 949 (N.J. Super. 
2004). "We have utilized the unitary harm rationale to shift the apportionment 
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burden to defendants in automobile crashworthiness cases. In these cases, we 
generally do not have multiple defendants, but instead have multiple causes of a 
unitary injury. Applying the doctrine, we shifted the burden to the defendant 
automobile manufacturer to apportion plaintiffs unitary harm by parsing the 
causes of harm." 
Numerous cases are cited by the Restatement Reporter in support of the rule 
requiring the manufacturer to apportion damages when such damages are unitary. 
An appropriate case is Oakes v. General Motors Corp., 628 N.E. 2d 341, 349 (IL. 
App. Ct. 1993). The court rejected Huddell because it would require a plaintiff 
who sustains injuries as a result of the defective design of an automobile to 
separate those injuries sustained as a result of the defect from those he would have 
sustained in the occurrence absent the defect. The court noted that a plaintiff 
would have to prove a negative based upon a hypothetical. This would be a nearly 
insurmountable burden. Therefore, Oakes adopted as a better reasoned the Fox-
Mitchell approach which required the defendant to apportion damages. 
Finally, Egberts reiterate the learning of General Motors Corporation v. 
FarnswortK 965 P.2d 1209, 1219 (Alaska 1998) in which the Court held that for 
policy reasons, it would be unfair to require a plaintiff who has already proved that 
a defect was a substantial factor in causing her injury to try another case based 
upon what might have happened absent the defect. A culpable defendant should 
not escape liability because the amount of enhanced injuries cannot be proven with 
certainty. This is in accord with Utah law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Egberts seek the following relief. First, the District Court should be 
instructed that Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6(3) remains unconstitutional. Second, the 
District Court should be instructed that the law of Utah embraces the Restatement 
(3d) of Torts: Products Liability 16(c) as it applies to the apportionment of 
damages in a crashworthiness case. 
DATED this 2[_ day of March, 2009. 
Kenneth D. Lougee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ORDER OF ACCEPTANCE 
This matter is before the court upon the Certification of 
Question of State Law to this court by the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Utah Supreme Court accepts the 
following questions certified to it: 
1. Is Utah Code Ann.§78-15-6(3)constitutional? 
2. Does Utah recognize Reinstatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability §16(b)-(d)? 
The certifying court has not filed any portion of the record 
in this matter with the Supreme Court. Within fourteen days of 
the date of this order, counsel for the parties shall advise this 
court as to what portions of the record they believe necessary 
for consideration of the certified questions. 
Following the expiration of the fourteen days, this court 
will request those portions of the record from the United States 
District Court and provide notice to the parties as to a briefing 
schedule. 
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Westlaw 
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167 P.3d 1058, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 17,825, 585 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2007 UT 64 
(Cite as: 167 P.3d 1058) 
Page 1 
HSupreme Court of Utah. 
Emily EGBERT and Jerad Egbert, individually and 
as guardians for J.E., a minor, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.; Nissan Motor 
Co., Ltd.; and Central Glass Co., 
Ltd., Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20060433. 
Aug. 24, 2007. 
Background: Driver and passenger brought products 
liability claims, based on strict liability and negli-
gence, against vehicle manufacturer, alleging that 
front passenger window, which shattered during roll-
over accident, was defectively designed. The United 
States District Court for the District of 
Utah, Paul G. Cassell J., 2006 WL 1278757, certi-
fied questions to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durrant, J., held that: 
£1} in a products liability case in which the defendant 
manufacturer's product complies with applicable 
government safety standards, the jury should be in-
structed that a presumption of non-defectiveness has 
arisen under the Utah Product Liability Act, and that 
a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to rebut 
it, and 
(2} Utah recognizes the ''enhanced injury" theory of 
products liability outlined in the Restatement of 
Torts. 
Certified questions answered. 
West Headnotes 
UQ Appeal and Error €^>861 
30k861 Most Cited Cases 
HI Federal Courts €^>392 
17QBk392 Most Cited Cases 
A certified question from the federal district court 
does not present the Utah Supreme Court with a deci-
sion to affirm or reverse a lower court's decision, and 
thus, traditional standards of review do not apply. 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 41. 
121 Federal Courts €=>392 
170Bk392 Most Cited Cases 
On certification of questions from a federal district 
court, the Utah Supreme Court answers the legal 
questions presented without resolving the underlying 
dispute. Rules App.Proc, Rule 41. 
131 Products Liability C^439 
313Ak439 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 313 Ak97) 
In a products liability case in which the defendant 
manufacturer's product complies with applicable 
government safety standards, the jury should be in-
structed that a presumption of non-defectiveness has 
arisen under the Utah Product Liability Act, and that 
a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to rebut 
it. West's U.C.A. §78-15-6(31 
1£ Evidence €^>89 
157k89 Most Cited Cases 
Where the standard of proof required to rebut a pre-
sumption is not specified in the statute creating the 
rebuttable presumption, the degree of proof required 
in a particular type of proceeding is traditionally left 
to the judiciary to resolve. 
1£ Evidence €^>596(1) 
157k596(l) Most Cited Cases 
The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the 
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence soci-
ety thinks he should have in the correctness of factual 
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. 
161 Evidence €=^596(1) 
157k596(T) Most Cited Cases 
The standard of proof serves to allocate the risk of 
error between the litigants and to indicate the relative 
importance attached to the ultimate decision. 
121 Criminal Law €=>561(1) 
110k561(1) Most Cited Cases 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard ap-
propriate for criminal defendants who stand to lose 
liberty or life upon conviction. 
181 Evidence €=^596(1) 
157k596(l) Most Cited Cases 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
167 P.3d 1058 Page 5 
167 P.3d 1058, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 17,825, 585 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2007 UT 64 
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explained that this was the case "[b]ecause the paren-
tal presumption deals with parental liberty interests, 
and accordingly should be afforded great deference 
by the courts." [FN 141 
FN8. Addineton. 441 U.S. at 424, 99 S.Ct. 
1804. 
FN9. See id. at 432-33, 99 S.Ct. 1804. 
FN10. See, e.g., Woodby v. INS. 385 U.S. 
276, 285, 87 S.Ct. 483, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 
(1966). 
FN11. See, e.g., Chaunt v. United States, 
364 U.S. 350, 353, 81 S.Ct 147, 5 L.Ed.2d 
120(1960). 
FN12. 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083. 
FN13. 7tf It 27. 
FN14./rf. 128. 
H 14 In this case, we hold that a preponderance of the 
evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of 
nondefectiveness in Utah Code section 78-15- 6(3). 
The kind of interest for which a higher standard of 
proof is appropriate, such as the parental liberty in-
terest in In re Estate of S.T.T., does not exist here. 
Nissan argues that clear and convincing evidence 
should be required to rebut the presumption because 
the government invested substantial amounts of time 
and money in studying the regulation at issue and that 
manufacturers should benefit by complying with such 
a carefully considered regulation. Nissan argues that, 
given the government's extensive studies, "it would 
be poor public policy ... to permit lay jurors to re-
evaluate the issue and decide by a mere preponder-
ance of the evidence relating to a single accident that 
[the government] was wrong." But the government's 
substantial investment in the safety regulation does 
not elevate a manufacturer's interest in that regulation 
to that of a fundamental liberty or particularly impor-
tant interest. Thus, we are not persuaded that the in-
terest at stake here rises to the level of requiring ap-
plication of the clear and convincing standard. 
[10] f 15 Nissan also argues for a clear and convinc-
ing standard because, in its view, to require only a 
preponderance of the evidence would render Utah 
Code section 78-15-6(3) a nullity. Nissan correctly 
explains that, at common law, the party claiming in-
jury because of a product defect already bears the 
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that there is a defect and that it caused the in-
jury. And at common law, a manufacturer's compli-
ance with governmental regulations would be evi-
dence tending to show no defect and would be 
weighed with all other evidence. Accordingly, Nissan 
argues that by creating the presumption of nondefec-
tiveness in section 78-15-6(3), the Legislature meant 
"to rachet-up ... the proof needed to overcome [the 
presumption] from what prevailed before it was 
passed," otherwise, the statute is of no benefit to the 
manufacturer. 
f 16 Although we agree with Nissan that the Legisla-
ture must have intended to benefit the manufacturer 
by creating the presumption of nondefectiveness, we 
disagree that the intended benefit is necessarily that 
the plaintiff be required to meet a higher standard of 
proof for rebuttal. Rather, the statutory presumption 
benefits the manufacturer by highlighting for the jury 
the significance of the plaintiffs burden of establish-
ing defectiveness by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. That is, the presumption clearly communicates 
to the jury that, for the plaintiff to succeed, the plain-
tiff must overcome by a preponderance of the evi-
dence the presumption that a product is nondefective 
because of the manufacturer's compliance with gov-
ernment safety standards. The presumption therefore 
gives a kind of legal imprimatur to the significance of 
compliance with federal standards. In light of this 
benefit to the manufacturer, requiring rebuttal by a 
preponderance of the evidence does not render the 
statute a nullity. 
K 17 In sum, we answer the first part of the federal 
district court's first question in the affirmative and 
hold that the jury should be instructed as to the pre-
sumption established by Utah Code section 78-15-
6(3). As to the second part of the first question, we 
hold that the jury should be instructed that a prepon-
derance of the evidence is sufficient to rebut this pre-
sumption. 
II. UTAH RECOGNIZES THE "ENHANCED 
INJURY" THEORY OF LIABILITY 
[11] ^ 18 The second question certified to us is the 
following: "Does Utah recognize the *1063 'en-
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hanced injury' theory of liability outlined in section 
16(a) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 167 P.3d 1058, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 17,825, 585 
Liability?" Our answer is yes. Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2007 UT 64 
If 19 Section 16(a) reads as follows: "When a product E N D OF DOCUMENT 
is defective at the time of commercial sale or other 
distribution and the defect is a substantial factor in 
increasing the plaintiffs harm beyond that which 
would have resulted from other causes, the product 
seller is subject to liability for the increased harm." 
[FN 151 This section embodies what is commonly 
referred to as the "enhanced injury" theory of liabil-
ity. It provides that a manufacturer of a defective 
product can be held liable for injuries resulting from 
an automobile accident-even if the defective product 
did not cause the accident-where the defect caused 
injuries over and above those that would have been 
expected in the accident absent the defect-in other 
words, "enhanced injuries." Like the majority of ju-
risdictions that have considered this issue, we now 
expressly recognize the "enhanced injury" theory of 
liability as the law in Utah. 
FN 15. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liability g 16(a) (1998). 
% 20 The Egberts and Nissan agree that we should 
recognize the "enhanced injury" theory of liability. 
They disagree, however, as to whether the plaintiff or 
the defendant manufacturer bears the burden of proof 
with respect to the allocation of injuries resulting 
from the underlying automobile accident and those 
resulting from the product defect. Indeed, the parties 
have briefed this issue at length. Because the question 
of who bears the burden of proof was not certified to 
us by the federal district court nor addressed in its 
order, however, we decline to address it. 
CONCLUSION 
f 21 As to the federal district court's first question, 
we hold that the jury should be instructed as to the 
presumption of nondefectiveness in Utah Code sec-
tion 78-15-6(3) and that a preponderance of the evi-
dence is sufficient to rebut it. As to the second ques-
tion, Utah recognizes the "enhanced injury" theory of 
tort liability outlined in section 16(a) of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. 
% 22 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Jus-
tice WILKINS, Justice PARRISR and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Justice DURRANTs opinion. 
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Preponderance of the evidence is the level of proof 
required in the typical civil case where only money 
damages are at stake. 
121 Evidence €=^596(1) 
157k596(l) Most Cited Cases 
An intermediate standard of proof, i.e., clear and 
convincing evidence, is appropriate when the inter-
ests at stake in a civil case are particularly important 
and more substantial than the mere loss of money. 
[101 Products Liability €=^343 
313Ak343 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 313Ak75.1) 
1101 Products Liability € ^ 3 4 9 
313Ak349 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 313Ak75.1) 
At common law, the party claiming injury because of 
a product defect bears the burden of showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there is a defect 
and that it caused the injury. 
i l l ] Products Liability €=^>H9 
313Akl 19 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 313 Ak8) 
111] Products Liability €=>147 
313Akl47 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 313 Ak 15) 
Utah recognizes the "enhanced injury" theory of 
products liability outlined in the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts, i.e., when a product is defective at the time 
of commercial sale or other distribution and the de-
fect is a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiffs 
harm beyond that which would have resulted from 
other causes, the product seller is subject to liability 
for the increased harm. Restatement Third, Torts 
(Products Liability) § 16(a). 
*1059 David C. Biggs, Piero G. Ruffinengo, Preston 
L. Handy, Darren A. Davis, Joseph W, Steele, 
Kenneth D. Lou gee. Salt Lake City, Jill M. 
Madajczyk, Patrick M. Ardis, Memphis, TN, for 
plaintiffs. 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Tracy H. Fowler, Kamie F. 
Brown, Troy Booher, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
DURRAMT, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
f 1 The Federal District Court for the District of 
Utah has certified to us the following two questions: 
1. In a product liability case where a manufacturer's 
product complies with applicable government 
safety standards, should the jury be instructed that 
a presumption of non-defectiveness has arisen un-
der Utah Code Ann. § 78-15- 6(3)? If so, should 
the instruction require clear and convincing evi-
dence of a defect to rebut the presumption, or is 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient 
for rebuttal? 
2. Does Utah recognize the "enhanced injury" the-
ory of liability outlined in § 16(a) of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability? 
As to the first question, we hold that the jury should 
be instructed that the presumption established by 
Utah Code section 78-15-6(3) has arisen and that a 
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to rebut it. 
As to the second question, we hold that Utah does 
recognize the "enhanced injury" theory of liability as 
outlined in section 16(a) of the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 The underlying federal case giving rise to the 
certified questions involves the facts that follow. In 
March 2002, Jerad and Emily Egbert were involved 
in an automobile accident on Interstate 15 near Cedar 
City, Utah. Mr. Egbert was driving the couple's 1998 
Nissan Altima, and Mrs. Egbert, who was nearly 
eight months pregnant with their daughter J.E., was 
riding in the front passenger seat. When Mr. Egbert 
tried to avoid another vehicle, he lost control of the 
car, and it rolled off the freeway approximately two 
and one-half times. 
t 3 At some point during the accident, the front pas-
senger window shattered. The window was made of 
tempered glass and met the applicable federal safety 
standards in place at the time the car was manufac-
tured. Mrs. Egbert was ejected through that window 
and suffered a broken pelvis, injuries to her bladder, 
abrasions, and contusions. J.E. was born prematurely 
by emergency C-section following the accident and 
has a serious brain injury. The parties dispute 
whether and to *1060 what extent the ejection 
proximately caused J.E.'s brain injury. 
^ 4 The Egberts brought products liability claims 
against Nissan under two different theories: strict 
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liability and negligence. They assert that the front 
passenger window was defectively designed because 
it was made with tempered glass, which shatters on 
impact, and not laminated glass, which is designed to 
remain intact even if it cracks and acts as a secondary 
restraint mechanism to keep occupants inside the 
vehicle. The Egberts argue that, had the Altima's 
window been made of laminated glass, Mrs. Egbert 
may have remained in the vehicle during the rollover 
and her injuries would have been less severe. They 
also argue that, had Mrs. Egbert not been ejected, J.E. 
may not have suffered a brain injury. 
% 5 Nissan argues that the Altima was not defective 
because the window complied with applicable gov-
ernment safety regulations, which allowed Nissan to 
use either tempered glass or laminated glass in the 
passenger window. In addition, Nissan argues that it 
was not negligent with respect to the design and 
manufacture of the car by using tempered glass in the 
front passenger window instead of laminated glass. 
Nissan further claims that the glass was not the 
proximate cause of any of Mrs. Egbert's or J.E.'s inju-
ries and that Mrs. Egbert would have been ejected 
from the Altima during the accident even if the win-
dow had been made with laminated glass. 
If 6 While preparing for trial, the parties disputed 
several areas of Utah law. The federal district court 
determined that the two issues certified to this court 
are controlling in the case and have not yet been de-
cided under Utah law. It subsequently certified both 
questions to us pursuant to rule 41 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2] f 7 A certified question from the federal dis-
trict court does not present us with a decision to af-
firm or reverse a lower court's decision; as such, "tra-
ditional standards of review do not apply." [FN1] 
"On certification, we 'answer the legal questions pre-
sented' without 'resolving the underlying dispute.1 " 
TFN21 
FN1. Robert J. DeBry <£ Assocs. v. Qwest 
Dex, Inc., 2006 UT 41,11 11. 144 P.3d 1079. 
FN2. In re Kum. 2004 UT 71, H 6. 99 P.3d 
793 (quoting Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. 
Bd. ofEduc., 2000 UT 87. If 1 n. Z 16 P.3d 
533). 
ANALYSIS 
I. THE JURY SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED 
THAT A PRESUMPTION OF 
NONDEFECTIVENESS 
HAS ARISEN UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 
78-15-6(3) AND THAT PROOF BY A 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IS 
SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME IT 
£3J Tf 8 The first question certified to us by the fed-
eral district court consists of two parts. First, "[i]n a 
product liability case where a manufacturer's product 
complies with applicable government safety stan-
dards, should the jury be instructed that a presump-
tion of non-defectiveness has arisen under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-15-6(3)?" fFN31 And *1061 second, *'[i]f 
so, should the instruction require clear and convinc-
ing evidence of a defect to rebut the presumption, or 
is proof by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient 
for rebuttal?" We address both questions in turn. 
FN3. The district court has not certified to 
us the question of this section's constitution-
ality, so we do not address it here. But we 
note that the section at issue is part of the 
Utah Product Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. 
S§ 78-15-1 to -7 (2002), which we held un-
constitutional in Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Cory., Ill P.2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985). In 
Berry, we specifically held section 78-15-3 
unconstitutional under article I, section 11 of 
the Utah Constitution-the open courts provi-
sion-because it was a statute of repose that 
barred certain claims before the cause of ac-
tion arose. Id at 681, 683, 685. We also 
held sections 78-15-4, -5, and -6 to be inva-
lid because they were not severable from the 
remainder of the Act. Id at 686. In response 
to our decision in Berry, the Legislature re-
pealed and reenacted section 78-15-3, 
changing it from a statute of repose to a 
statute of limitations, and thereby addressed 
our constitutional concerns with the original 
section. See 1989 Utah Laws 268. The Leg-
islature made no change to section 78-15-6, 
which has remained on the books since 
Berry. We have not since directly addressed 
the constitutionality of section 78- 15-6, but 
we have, in several cases, referred to it 
without sua sponte raising any question as to 
its constitutionality. See Grundberg v. Up-
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John Co.. 813 P.2d 89. 97 n. 7 (Utah 1991) 
(referring to section 78- 15-6 as support for 
the Legislature's approving view of govern-
mental standards and stating that, 
"[although section 78-15-6 was neither re-
pealed, amended, nor specifically reenacted, 
there is no indication that the legislature has 
changed its policy regarding deference to 
governmental standards"); see also Slisze v. 
Stanlev-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, % 18, 979 
P.2d 317 (finding that the district court 
"properly admitted [an OSHA] regulation to 
establish a rebuttable presumption of non-
defectiveness under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
15-6(3)," without commenting on the consti-
tutionality of that section). 
\ 9 As to the first question, we hold that the jury 
should be informed of the presumption of nondefec-
tiveness under Utah Code section 78-15-6(3). That 
section reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is 
free from any defect or defective condition where 
the alleged defect in the plans or designs for the 
product or the methods and techniques of manufac-
turing, inspecting and testing the product were in 
conformity with government standards established 
for that industry which were in existence at the 
time the plans or designs for the product or the 
methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspect-
ing and testing the product were adopted. [FN4] 
FN4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) (2002). 
If 10 It is common to instruct juries as to the law, and 
as to presumptions specifically. Presumptions gener-
ally must be incorporated into the fact-finding proc-
ess for juries to appropriately discharge their obliga-
tions as fact finders. The Egberts do not cite a good 
reason, and we cannot conceive of one, not to instruct 
the jury here that the rebuttable presumption of non-
defectiveness applies to Nissan. 
[4] f 11 We next consider whether the presumption 
in the jury instruction may be rebutted by a prepon-
derance of the evidence or whether clear and con-
vincing evidence is required. As we have noted, 
where, as in this case, the standard of proof required 
to rebut a presumption is not specified in the statute, 
"[t]he degree of proof required in a particular type of 
proceeding has 'traditionally been left to the judiciary 
to resolve.'" [FN51 
FN5. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of 
S.TT). 2006 UT 46, % 28, 144 P.3d 1083 
(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
755. 102 S.Ct. 1388. 71 L.Ed.2d 599 
(1982)). 
[51[61f71[81 H 12 As to standards of proof generally, 
the United States Supreme Court has said as follows: 
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept 
is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the 
realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder 
concerning the degree of confidence our society 
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual 
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." 
The standard serves to allocate the risk of error be-
tween the litigants and to indicate the relative im-
portance attached to the ultimate decision. fFN6] 
FN6. Addinzton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 
99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (quot-
ing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358. 370. 90 
S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, 
J., concurring)). 
Thus, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the stan-
dard appropriate for criminal defendants who stand to 
lose liberty or life upon conviction, while a prepon-
derance of the evidence is the level of proof required 
in the typical civil case where only money damages 
are at stake. fFN7] 
FN7. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755-56, 102 
S.Ct. 1388. 
[91 H 13 The intermediate standard of proof-clear 
and convincing evidence—is appropriate when the 
interests at stake in a civil case are "particularly im-
portant" and "more substantial than the mere loss of 
money." [FN81 For example, the United States Su-
preme Court has applied this standard in cases in-
volving civil commitment, [FN9] deportation, [FN 10] 
and denaturalization. [FN 11] We applied this stan-
dard in *1062Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of 
S.T.T.), [FN 12] where we considered the appropriate 
standard of proof for rebutting the "presumption that 
parents act in the best interests of their children" in 
Utah's Grandparent Visitation Statute. fFN13] We 
held "that a clear and convincing standard of proof 
should apply to satisfy due process requirements" and 
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Chapter 4. Provisions Of General Applicability 
Topic 1. Causation 
§ 16. Increased Harm Due To Product Defect 
Link to Case Citatioi is 
(a) When a product is defective at the time of commercial sale or other distribution and the defect is a 
substantial factor in increasing the plaintiffs harm beyond that which would have resulted from oilier 
causes, the product seller is subject to liability for the increased harm 
I hi 11 proof supports a determination of the harm that would have resulted from other causes in the ab-
sence of the product defect, the product seller's liability is limited to the increased harm fittrihiil'ihle 
solely (o the product defect, 
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Subsection (b) of the harm that would have resulted 
in the absence of the product defect, the product seller is liable for all of the plaintiffs harm attributable 
to the defect and other causes. 
(d) A seller of a defective product thai is held liaHe 1*>J -^ a* * A n*-.. haim ^altered by the plaintiff under 
Subsection (b), or all of the harm MIH'I r= d f- IIN plaintifl under Subsection (c), is jointly and severally li-
able or severally liable with other parties Mho beat legal responsibility !'<** cau^inii \Uv harm, determined 
by applicable rules of joint and several liability ., 
I 
„,. ^..^miy for increased harm, 1 his Section deals with the problem of increased harm, often referred to as the 
issue of "enhancement" of harm. Liability for increased harm arises most frequently in automobile crashworthi-
ness cases, but can also arise in connection with other products. Typically, the plaintiff is involved in an auto-
mobile accident caused by conduct or circumstances other than a product defect. The plaintiff would have 
suffered some injury as a result of the accident even in the absence of the claimed product defect. However, the 
plaintiff contends that the injuries were aggravated by the vehicle's failiire reasonably to protect occupants in the 
event of an accident. 
In the early era of product design litigation, controversy arose over whether a manufactui er owed any obliga-
tion to design its product so that injuries would be reasonably minimized in the event of an accident. That con-
troversy is now settled. Although accidents are not intended uses of products, they are generally foreseeable. A 
manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture its product so as reasonably to reduce the foreseeable harm 
that may occur in an accident brought about by causes other than a product defect. See Comment b. Since the 
fpi o n n o nr u. > ~ - - . r> * - n T 
REST 3d TORTS-PL § 16 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 16 (1998) 
product seller is responsible only for the increased harm, and not for the harm that would have occurred even in 
the absence of the product defect, basic principles of causation limit the damages to those resulting from the in-
creased harm caused by the defect. The plaintiff must establish that the defect was a substantial factor in increas-
ing the harm beyond that which would have resulted from other causes. Once the plaintiff establishes such in-
creased harm, Subsection (b) or (c) applies. If proof supports a determination of what harm would have occurred 
without a defect, then liability is limited to the increased harm. If proof does not support such a determination, 
then the product seller is liable for all of the plaintiffs harm from both the defect and other causes. 
Illustrations: 
1. Bob negligently lost control of his car and collided with Ann's car, causing Ann to suffer harm from be-
ing thrown against her car's steering wheel. Ann was driving a car manufactured by XYZ Motor Co. In addi-
tion to suing Bob for his negligence, Ann sues XYZ. Expert testimony establishes that a reasonable alternative 
design of the steering mechanism was available that would have cushioned the impact between Ann and the 
steering column and that its omission rendered the car not reasonably safe. Further expert testimony describes 
the extent to which the omission of the alternative design increased the harm. Defendant XYZ is liable for 
harm that the trier of fact concludes the plaintiff suffered beyond the harm that would have been suffered had 
the car been equipped with the reasonable alternative design.2. While Arthur was driving a snowmobile manu-
factured by ABC Co., the snowmobile hit a snow-covered rock. On impact, Arthur fell off the snowmobile 
and his face struck a brake bracket on the side of the snowmobile. Two sharp metal protrusions on the bracket 
caused serious facial injury. Competent testimony establishes that the brake bracket could have been covered 
by a safety guard that would have prevented such serious injury and that omission of the guard rendered the 
product not reasonably safe. Competent testimony also indicates the extent to which absence of the guard in-
creased Arthur's harm. ABC is subject to liability for the harm that the trier of fact finds would have been pre-
vented by a safety guard. 
b. Establishing defect in increased-harm cases. To establish liability for increased harm, the plaintiff must 
prove that a product defect caused the harm under the rules stated in §§ 1-4. When the plaintiff alleges that a 
manufacturing defect caused increased harm, the plaintiff must establish a defect as set forth in § 2(a). When the 
plaintiff alleges that a design defect or a defect due to inadequate instructions or warnings caused increased 
harm, the plaintiff must establish that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted, or that reason-
able instructions or warnings could have been provided, as set forth in §§ 2(b) and 2(c). 
In connection with a design defect claim in the context of increased harm, the plaintiff must establish that a 
reasonable alternative design would have reduced the plaintiffs harm. The factors enumerated in § 2, Comment 
/, for determining the reasonableness of an alternative design and the reasonable safety of the product are fully 
applicable to establishing defect in an increased-harm case. Furthermore, the alternative to the product design 
must increase the overall safety of the product. It is not sufficient that the alternative design would have reduced 
or prevented the harm the plaintiff suffered if the alternative would introduce into the product other dangers of 
equal or greater magnitude. 
Proof of defect does not, of itself, establish a case of increased harm. The plaintiff must also establish that the 
defect was a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiffs harm beyond the harm that would have occurred from 
other causes. Subsection (c) provides that, when proof does not support a determination of increased harm, the 
product seller is liable for all harm suffered by the victim. However, the rule stated in Subsection (c) does not 
take effect until the plaintiff establishes under Subsection (a), by competent testimony, that the plaintiffs harm 
was increased as a result of the product defect. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 16 (1998) 
l i i t i-Ji . i l ions : 
.3. George was a passenger in a van manufactured by the A U Motor Co. The van was driven by a co-
worker, Alice, who was proceeding non-negligently along a highway at 50 mph. To avoid a dog that unexpec-
tedly ran across the highway, Alice swerved and lost control of the van, which struck an abutment. The force 
and angle of the collision caused the van to fly in the air and travel 75 feet before coming to rest upside down. 
During or after the initial collision, the roof panel separated from the van. George was thrown through the roof 
area and landed 50 feet from the van. Competent testimony by George's expert establishes that the welds 
meant to hold the roof to the body of the van were defective and did not meet the XYZ design standards. 
George's expert evidence also supports a determination that, had the roof been properly welded, it would not 
have come off as a result of the collision, that George would have remained in the van, and that the harm he 
suffered as a result of being thrown from the van was more serious than it would have been if the roof had 
kept George inside the van. Expert testimony also supports a determination of the extent to which George 
would have been harmed if he had stayed in the van, and thus the extent to which George's harm was in-
creased by the failure of the roof to remain attached to the van. XYZ is liable for George's harm above that 
which the trier of fact determines George would have suffered in the absence of the defective welds.4. Alice 
was operating a tractor manufactured by XYZ Farm Equipment. The tractor was designed for use on hills and 
sharp inclines. The tractor struck a large rock protruding from the ground, causing the tractor to roll over 
down a slope. Alice was thrown from the tractor and pinned beneath it. Alice's expert testifies that, had the 
tractor been designed with a rollover protection system, Alice would not have been thrown from the tractor 
and that the omission of the rollover protection system rendered the product not reasonably safe. This testi-
mony supports a finding of defective design. Expert testimony also describes the extent to which Alice's harm 
was increased by the omission of the rollover protection system. Defendant XYZ is subject to liability for 
Alice's harm beyond that which the trier of fact finds she would have suffered had the tractor been equipped 
with the rollover protection system.5. Richard suffered harm as a result of an automobile accident that oc-
curred when he lost control of his car on a rain-soaked highway. The car slid off the highway and collided 
sideways with a steel pole. As a result of the force of the collision, the pole ripped through the body of the car 
and crushed Richard between the front seat and the area of the roof just above the windshield. Richard brings 
suit against the XYZ Motor Co., the manufacturer of the car, alleging that the car was defective in design in 
that it did not have a continuous steel frame extending through the door panels. Richard's experts assert that, 
had the vehicle been so designed, it would have bounced off the pole, preventing penetration by the pole into 
the passenger space. XYZ's experts assert that a continuous steel frame would also reduce front-to-back de-
formation of the body of the vehicle in a head-on crash. Deformation is desirable in head-on crashes because it 
absorbs the impact of the crash and decreases risk of harm to the occupants of the vehicle, Richard's experts 
admit on cross-examination that, for head-on automobile accidents, the alternative design offered by Richard 
would decrease safety. Even if the design alternative offered by Richard would have reduced his harm, if the 
trier of fact finds that Richard's proposed alternative would have decreased the overall safety of the vehicle, it 
should return a verdict for XYZ, 
c. Determination of what harm would have resulted in the absence of the product defect. The task of determin-
ing what harm would have resulted had the product not been defective under Subsection (b) is often difficult. 
Outright guesswork is not permitted, but neither should anything approaching certainty be required. When an 
expert offers a rational explanation derived from a causal analysis, the testimony shnni.* siibject to the normal 
discretion of the trial court, be admitted for consideration by the trier of fact 
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resulted in the absence of the product defect. Subsection (c) provides that when the plaintiff has proved defect-
caused increased harm, the product seller is subject to liability for all harm suffered by the plaintiff if proof does 
not support a determination of what harm would have resulted if the product had not been defective. The defend-
ant, a wrongdoer who in fact has caused harm to the plaintiff, should not escape liability because the nature of 
the harm makes such a determination impossible. Compare § 433B(2) of the Restatement, Second, of Torts. 
Illustration: 
6. The same facts as Illustration 3, in that George proves that the defect was a substantial factor in increas-
ing the harm beyond that which he would have suffered if the roof had kept him inside the van, but George is 
unable to quantify the extent of the increased harm. Neither party introduces proof that supports the apportion-
ment of liability. XYZ is liable for all of George's harm. 
e. Joint and several liability for increased harm. When the plaintiff proves defect-caused increased harm, and 
the seller of the defective product is held liable for part of the harm suffered by the plaintiff under Subsection 
(b) or all of the harm suffered by the plaintiff under Subsection (c), liability of the seller and other tortfeasors is 
joint and several. In a case under Subsection (b), the manufacturer is jointly and severally liable only for the in-
creased harm; in a case under Subsection (c), for the entire harm. Joint and several liability is imposed because 
there is no practical method of apportioning responsibility that would reflect the separate causal contributions of 
those tortfeasors who caused the increased harm. The general rules governing joint and several liability determ-
ine the liability of the parties to the injured plaintiff. In those jurisdictions that retain the common-law rule, all 
parties bear full responsibility for the entirety of the harm. In many jurisdictions, the common-law rules of joint 
and several liability have undergone significant legislative modification limiting liability to the percentage of 
fault allocated to each party. 
Illustrations: 
7. Same facts as Illustration 6, except that Alice's negligent driving caused her to lose control of her van. 
The XYZ Motor Co. is liable under Subsection (c) for all of George's harm. The case is governed by the law 
of State A, which follows the common-law rule of joint and several liability. George may recover all of his 
damages from either Alice or XYZ.8. Same facts as Illustration 7. The XYZ Motor Co. is liable under Subsec-
tion (c) for all of George's harm. The case is governed by the law of State B, whose statute limits the liability 
of joint tortfeasors to the percentage of responsibility allocated to each party. The trier of fact allocates 40 per-
cent of the responsibility to Alice and 60 percent of the responsibility to XYZ. XYZ's liability is limited to 60 
percent of the total damages.9. Same facts as Illustration 7. The XYZ Motor Co. is liable under Subsection (c) 
for all of George's harm. The case is governed by the law of State C, whose statute retains the common-law 
rule of joint and several liability for economic loss but limits the liability of joint tortfeasors for noneconomic 
loss to the percentage of responsibility allocated to each party. The trier of fact has allocated 40 percent of the 
responsibility to Alice and 60 percent to XYZ. George may recover all of his economic loss damages from 
either Alice or XYZ. His recovery from XYZ for noneconomic damages is limited to 60 percent. 
/ . Plaintiff s fault in cases of increased harm. Section 17 sets forth the general rules governing plaintiffs fault 
in products liability litigation. It provides that plaintiff's fault is relevant in apportioning liability between the 
plaintiff and the product seller. The seriousness of the plaintiff's fault and the nature of the product defect are 
relevant in apportioning the appropriate percentages of responsibility between the plaintiff and the product 
seller. See § 17, Comment d. Accordingly, the contributory fault of the plaintiff in causing an accident that res-
ults in defect-related increased harm is relevant in apportioning responsibility between or among the parties, ac-
cording to applicable apportionment law. In apportioning responsibility in such cases, it may be important that 
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requiring a product to be designed reasonably to prevent increased harm aims to protect persons in circum 
stances in which they are unable to protect themselves. 
RKPORTKRS'NOl E 
Comment a. Liability for increased harm. Increased-harm liability problems have also arisen with regard to 
products other than motor vehicles. See, e.g., McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 188 Cal.Rplr. 542 
(CaI.Ct.App.1983) (airplane); Camacho v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987), cert, denied, 485 
U.S. 901, 108 S.Ct. 1067. 99 L.Ed.2d 229 (1988) (motorcycle); Tafoya v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330 
(10th Cir. 1989) (applying enhanced injury doctrine to riding lawnmower under Colorado law); Rubin v. Brutus 
Corp., 487 So.2d 360 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986), review denied, 500 So.2d 543 (1986) (pleasure boat); H'illrichs v. 
Avco Corp.. 478 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1991.) (grain harvester); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139 (lnd.1990) 
(motorcycle); Masterman v. Veldman's Equip., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988) (snowplow mount); 
Smith v. Ariens Co.. 377 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1978) (snowmobile); Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 537 A.2d 622 
(Md.Ct.Spec.App.1988) (snowplow hitch), rev'd, Montgomery CoinUy v. Valk Mfg. Co., 562 A.2d 1246 
(Md.1989); Free v. Brunswick Corp., 983 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Missouri law), cert denied, 510 
U.S. 815. 114 S.Ct. 65, 126 L.Ed.2d 35 (1993) (motorboat propeller); Roe v. Deere & Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 151 
(3d Cir. 1988) (applying Pennsylvania law) (agricultural tractor); Farrell v. John Deere Co., 443 N.W.2d 50 
(Wis. A p J. 1989) (corn picker). 
In the early years of tort liability for defective product design, some courts refused to recognize a duty on the 
part of an auto manufacturer to design a reasonably crashworthy vehicle. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors 
Corp.. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 836, 87 S.Ct. 83, 17 I .Ed.2d 70 (1966). The over-
whelming majority, however, followed the view of Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th 
Cir. 1968), which held that collisions are foreseeable and that manufacturers must design cars so that they are 
reasonably crashworthy. The Larsen rule appears now to be the unanimous position of American courts. In 
Blankenship v. G eneral Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W.Va. 1991), the court reviewed the authority and found 
no support for Evans, which itself was overruled in Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110 (7th 
Cir. 1977). The Reporters are unaware of any jurisdiction that espouses Evans. For an exhaustive listing of the 
cases following Larsen, see Levenstam and Lapp, Plaintiffs Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in Crashworthi-
ness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 De Paul I ,. Rev. 55, 61 n.33 (1989). 
Illustration 1 is based on Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 393 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). Illustration 2 is b.i-^ -d 
on Smith v. Aliens Co., 377 ME.2d 954 (Mass/1978). 
Comment b. Establishing defect in increased-harm cases. When a plaintiff alleges that the product should 
have been designed more safely, or been accompanied by instructions or warnings so as to avoid enhanced injur-
ies, a plaintiff must establish that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted or reasonable instruc-
tions or warnings could have been provided. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1188 
(Ala.1985), overruled on other grounds by Schwartz v Volvo North Am. Corp., 554 So.2d 927 (Ala. 1989). f" .. 
proof of defectiveness [in an enhanced harm case] also requires proof that a safer practical, alternative de^ui 
was available to the manufacturer"); Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 478 N,W.2d 70, 75 (Iowa 1991) (one of the ele-
ments of a prima facie claim for enhanced injury is "... proof of an alternative safer design, practicable under .1 e 
circumstances"); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1992); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1 . *\ 
1143 (lnd.1990) ("A claimant should be able to demonstrate that a feasible, safer, more practicable product 
design would have afforded better protection."); Page v. Gilbert, 598 So.2d ! ; "i. '• ! : i La.Ct.Apr. 1992). K>r 
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cases arising after the passage of La Re\. Stat. § 9:2800.56 the plaintiff in a crashworthiness case must establish 
(1) the availability of an alternative design that would have reduced the plaintiffs harm; and "(2) the likelihood 
that the product's design would cause the claimant's damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed the bur-
den on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative 
design on the utility of the product." SeeTolher \ . General Motors Corp., 482 So.2d 213. 218 (Miss. 1985) ("To 
prove his case [crashworthiness based on defective design], the plaintiff may introduce evidence of industry 
standards, to show deviation therefrom, or an alternate design, to show the feasibility thereof."); Huddell \. Lev-
in, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir.1976) (applying New Jersey law); Crispin v. Volksvvagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 
966, 976-78 (NJ.Super.Ct.App.Div.1991), cert, denied, 599 A.2d 162 (1991) (given the tendency of the VW 
seat to yield upon impact, VW had a duty to warn about the necessity to wear seat belts to protect occupants 
from injury in the case of collision. Crispin is a crashworthiness case in which the failure-to-warn issue was 
presented as relevant to increased harm). Contra, e.g., Rahmig ^. Moslex Mach. Co., Inc.. 412 N.W.2d 56, 81-82 
(Neb. 1987) (plaintiff does not have to prove alternative safer design); Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 
728 P.2d 585 (Wash. 1986). 
Illustration 3 is based on Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co.. Inc., 398 A.2d 490 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1979). 
Illustration 4 is based on Roe v. Deere & Co., Inc.. 855 F.2d 151 (3d Cir.1988). Illustration 5 is based on 
Dawson \ . Chrysler Corp., 630 F 2d 950 (3d Cir.1980). 
Comment c. Determination of what harm would have resulted in the absence of the product defect. Numerous 
courts have recognized that the task of allocating causal responsibility in enhanced injury cases is a difficult one 
and certainty in apportionment often is not attainable. Rather, courts must rely on reasonable estimations by ex-
perts to accomplish apportionment. See, e.g., Ma\ \ . Portland Jeep. Inc.. 509 P.2d 24 (Or. 1973); Hillrichs v. 
A\ co Corp., 478 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1991); Reed \. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992). 
Comment d. Extent of liability for increased harm when proof does not support determination of what harm 
would have resulted in the absence of the product defect. A strong majority of courts that have considered the 
question have adopted a rule that supports § 16(c). Thus, if a plaintiff establishes that a product defect was a 
substantial factor in increasing the harm suffered by the plaintiff beyond that which would have resulted from 
other causes, and if proof adduced at trial does not support apportionment of liability, then the product seller is 
liable for all the harm suffered by the plaintiff from both the defect and the other causes. 
The rule in § 16(c) is similar to that set forth in § 433B(2) of the Restatement, Second, of Torts. Section 
433BC2) provides that when the tortious conduct of two or more actors combines to bring about harm to a 
plaintiff, and one of the actors seeks to limit liability claiming that the harm is apportionable, the burden of 
proof concerning apportionment is upon that actor. As Comment d to § 433B(2) explains, the reason for shifting 
the burden of apportionment to the defendant is the injustice of allowing a proved wrongdoer, who has in fact 
caused harm to the plaintiff, to escape liability because another wrongdoer or causal agent also was involved and 
the nature of the harm makes apportionment impossible. Illustration 8 to § 433B(2) is parallel to a case of 
product-defect-caused increase in harm. In that Illustration, two automobiles collide and an occupant of one of 
the cars suffers harm to his shoulder caused by the negligence of the other. Immediately thereafter a car negli-
gently driven by a third party drives into the wreckage and inflicts further harm to the occupant's shoulder. As a 
result of one impact or the other, or both, the occupant's arm becomes paralyzed. The burden is upon the third 
driver, who drove into the wreckage, to prove that the additional injury inflicted by that driver's conduct did not 
cause the paralysis. 
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Section 16(c) does not formally shift any burden of proof to the defendant. Its effect is that, if the plaintiff has 
established that the product defect increased the harm over and above that which the plaintiff would have 
suffered had the product been nondefective, and if, at the close of the case, proof does not support a determina-
tion of the harm that would have resulted in the absence of the product defect, then the defendant is liable for all 
the harm, suffered by the plaintiff. 
The majority view will be referred to as the Fox-Mitchell approach, named after two early cases that espoused 
the position. The opposing, minority view, which will be referred to as the Huddell approach, insists that the 
plaintiff must prove the extent of the increased harm. If the plaintiff is unable to quantify the increased harm, 
even if the plaintiff can establish that some increased harm was caused by the defendant, the plaintiff is unable 
to recover. 
The Fox-Mitchell approach. This discussion sets forth the case law that supports the Fox-Mitchell approach. It 
includes those states whose law either supports, or is strongly leaning toward, the majority view. The following 
states are in the Fox-Mitchell camp: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, In-
diana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Thus, a total of 23 states favor the position taken in § 
16(c). In addition, cases in Arkansas and Colorado offer good reason to believe that they would adopt the Fox-
Mitchell approach when next that issue comes before them. In the ensuing discussion the cases that support the 
Fox-Mitchell position are listed without commentary. When some explanation is necessary for concluding that a 
state would adopt the Fox-Mitchell approach, it is set forth 
General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1189 (Ala. 1985), overruled on other grounds by 
Schwartz v. Volvo North Am. Corp., 554 So.2d 927 (Ala. 1989), clearly supports the majority view, rhe 
Alabama court held:Consequently, the only proof of damages that will limit the manufacturer's liability in 
crashworthiness cases is proof that, regardless of the design used, the identical injuries were inevitable. In 
such a case, the manufacturer's liability is not only limited, it is completely eliminated, because plaintiff has 
failed to prove 'cause in fact,' a fundamental element necessary to prove proximate cause between the defect-
ive condition and his injuries..,. If, on the other hand, the proof shows that an alternative design would have 
eliminated plaintiffs injuries totally or would have reduced them, proximate cause between the defect and the 
injury is proven, and the manufacturer is jointly and severally liable along with the striking driver (assuming 
that he is found liable) for the entire amount of the injuries suffered. Thus, the manufacturer faces an all or 
nothing proposition; either he is liable for all the damages or he is liable for none, depending upon whether an 
alternative design would have prevented or reduced plaintiffs injuries. 
See also Czarnecki. v. Volkswagen of Am., 837 P.2d 1143, 1 148 (Ariz.Ct.App.1991) ("[I]n a crashworthiness 
case with an indivisible injury, the plaintiff fulfills his burden of proof by showing that the defective design 
caused him to sustain injuries over and above those that otherwise would have occurred in the first collision. 
Once the plaintiff has [proven some enhancement], the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the damages 
that arose from the enhanced injury are apportionable.")*, McLeod v. American Motors Corp., 723 F.2d 830, 
834-35 (Ilth Cir. 1984) (applying Florida law, drawing analogy from successive collision cases in which 
plaintiff is able to recover from either defendant if damages cannot be apportioned); Pulsion v. Boomcrshine 
Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 659 (Ga/1992); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors (V>rr 6<C V V vis ;\t\.rx0 
1984). 
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case the tortfeasor who caused the accident and the auto manufacturer whose design was responsible for the 
increased harm should be treated as joint tortfeasors. There is language in Buehler that supports such a read-
ing. 374 N.E.2d at 465. However, on its facts, it is clear that the design defect alleged by the plaintiffs was re-
sponsible for all the enhanced injury. The parties had stipulated that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs was 
entirely caused by burns. The burns resulted when the car in which the plaintiffs were riding was rear-ended. 
The design defect was inadequate fire protection between the trunk and the passenger compartment that per-
mitted the fire to spread before the occupants could exit the vehicle. Thus, the auto manufacturer could not 
claim that it was being held liable for injuries which it did not, in fact, cause. However, in Oakes v. General 
Motors Corp., 628 N.E.2d 341 (Ul.App.CU993), leave to appeal denied, 633 N.E.2d 4 (1994), an intermediate 
appellate court reviewed Buehler, supra and other Illinois cases and found that Illinois law rejects Huddell and 
would follow the Fox-Mitchell majority view. In rejecting Huddell the Oakes court noted:This formulation of 
the enhanced injury doctrine would require a plaintiff who sustains injuries as a result of the defective design 
of an automobile to separate those injuries sustained as a result of the defect from those injuries which he 
would have sustained in the occurrence absent the defect. As plaintiff points out, under this rule, he would be 
required to establish what injuries he might have received even though he did not receive them. In other 
words, plaintiff would have to prove a negative based on a hypothetical set of facts. We consider this to be a 
nearly insurmountable burden, particularly here where plaintiffs injury is incapable of being logically or reas-
onably divided. In Larsen, the defendant, General Motors, concurred in this view. Ostensibly arguing against 
the enhanced injury doctrine in that case, General Motors contended that the enhanced injury arising from a 
design defect would be "difficult to assess." (Larsetu 391 F.2d at 503). It is ironic that here, notwithstanding 
the indivisible nature of plaintiffs injury, the determination of the enhanced injury, in General Motors's view, 
is an easy feat. 
628 N.E.2d at 348. 
The Oakes court then went on to adopt the Mitchell approach to crashworthiness and noted that under 
MitchelLTht plaintiff must show only that the design defect was a "substantial factor" in producing damages 
over and above those which were probably caused as a result of the original impact or collision. The 
[Mitchell] court went on to hold that if the manufacturer's negligence is found to be a substantial factor in 
causing an indivisible injury such as paraplegia or death, then "absent a reasonable basis to determine which 
wrongdoer actually caused the harm, the defendants should be treated as joint and several tortfeasors...." 
Id. 628 N.E.2d at 349. See also DePaepe \ . General Motors Corp., 33 F.3d 737 (7th Cir.1994) (adopting 
Oakes as the governing law in Illinois). 
In Masterman v. Veldman's Equip.. Inc.. 530 N.E.2d 312 (Ind.Cl.App.1988), the court placed the burden of 
proving the amount of increased harm on the plaintiff. However, in Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207. 1220 
(Ind.Ct.App.1989), the court held that a plaintiff can establish proximate cause in a crashworthiness case by 
"establishing that the defectively designed product was a substantial factor in producing damages over and 
above those which were probably caused as a result of the original impact or collision. Once the plaintiff estab-
lishes the foregoing, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish and prove that the damages that arose from 
the enhanced injury are apportionable." The Jackson case contains a thorough analysis of Indiana law on the is-
sue and more likely reflects what Indiana law on the subject ultimately will be. 
See also Page v. Gilbert, 598 So.2d 1110 (La.Ct.App.1992). Page does not speak directly to the burden of 
proof issue raised in § 16(c). However, it indirectly supports the position that the manufacturer responsible for 
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second-collision injuries is treated as a joint tortfeasor. In Page, the driver of the car who caused the collision 
and the manufacturer of the automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger were each held to be 50 percent at 
fault. It is clear from the decision that no causal apportionment based on how much increased harm was caused 
by the design defect in the automobile was undertaken. Armstrong v. I.orino, 580 So.2d 528 (La.Ct.App.199I), 
is erroneously cited in Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 659, 661 n. 1 (1992), as 
supportive of the Huddell position. In Armstrong, the appellate court upheld the trial court's grant of a directed 
verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to establish either defect or any enhancement whatsoever Thus, 
.Armstrong, often cited in support of Huddell, does not support that position in any fashion. 
Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., Inc.. 398 A.2d 490, 498 (M.d.CT.Spec.App.1979), rev'd on other 
grounds, General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039 (Md.1980); Vaik Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 537 A,2d 
622, 633 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, Montgomery County v. Vaik Mfg. Co., 562 A.2d 
1246 (Md.1989); Mitchell v. Voikswagenwerk, AG. 669 F.2d 1 199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law); 
Richardson v. Voikswagenwerk. A.G., 552 F.Supp. 73, 82-83 (W.D.Mo. 1982) (applying Missouri law) and Mc-
Dowell v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 799 S.W.2d 854, 867 (Mo.Ct.App. 1990) (rejecting Huddell and hold-
^hat "a plaintiff meets his burden of proof on causation if the evidence shows that the product was a substan-
..«. factor in causing injuries in excess of those caused by the first collision"). Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A., 509 
N.\V.2d 603, 61 1 (Neb. 1994) (adopting Fox-Mitchell). 
i.vcii JNCW Jersey, the state in which the rule contrary to Fox-Mitchell was spawned, may wind up adopting 
Fox-Mitchell. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law), is the leading case re-
u! --iiii rie plaintiff to prove the extent of enhanced damages as a predicate for recover)'. But in Crispin v. Voik-
swagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966. 980 n. 1 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1991), the court noted that the New Jersey Su-
preme Court had not as yet decided whether plaintiff or defendant has the burden of apportionment in a crash-
worthiness case. It then noted, "[a] rule placing upon the defendant the burden of proof with respect to the ap-
portionment of damages, may be more in line with our Supreme Court's recent decision in Scafidi v. Seller, ... 
574 A.2d 398 (N.J. 1990). See also Fosgate v. Corona, ... 330 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1974) ...." But see McLaughlin v. 
Nissan Motor Corp., 630 A.2d 857 (NJ.Super.Ct.Lavv Div.1993) and Thornton v. General Motors Corp., 655 
A.2d 107 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1994) (disagreeing with McLaughlin and applying Fox-Mitchell in a New Jer-
sey crashworthiness case). 
See also Warren v. Colombo, 377 S.E.2d 249 (N.C.Ct.App. 1989) (adopting crashworthiness theory). Phe 
court acknowledged that courts would be faced with difficult apportionment problems. But see opinion of Green, 
J., concurring, in which he applies Restatement. Second, Torts § 433(B)(2) to a crashworthiness case. In Seese 
v. Voikswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3d Cir.1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 867, 102 S.Ct. 330, 70 L.Ed.2d 
168 (1981), the court predicted that North Carolina would adopt Huddell. This position was refuted by the 
Fourth Circuit in a series of cases. See Erwin v. Jeep Corp., 812 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1987). The authority of Seese 
as a predictor of North Carolina law on the subject of apportionment is weak. Seese did not undertake any ana-
lysis of North Carolina law on the subject of who should bear the burden of proof on apportionment. It simply 
applied the Huddell criteria unquestioningly. Pang v. Minch, 559 N.E.2d 1313, 1324 (Ohio 1990) (successive 
collision case holding that when "a single indivisible injury is proximately caused by the successive tortious acts 
of multiple defendants," § 433B(2) of the Restatement, Second, of Torts, applies, and the plaintiff is entitled to 
treat the successive tortfeasors as jointly and severally liable). Pang cites with approval Richardson v. Voikswa-
genwerk, A.G., supra, a crashworthiness case that treats the manufacturer and the tortfeasor as joint tortfeasors; 
see also Ault v. Navistar Int'l ITansp. Corp., 880 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished disposition) (Sixth Cir 
cuit refuses to apply Huddell standard in a crashworthiness wrongful death case). Pang almost certainly places 
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Ohio among the states that would adopt the rule stated in Subsection (c). 
See also Lee \. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1287-88 (Okla.1984) (Plaintiff has the burden of 
proving that the product defect was the cause of enhanced injuries. If the court finds that the injury is single 
and indivisible, the parties are treated as concurrent tortfeasors and are jointly and severally liable. At that 
point the burden shifts to the defendant to prove apportionment of the enhanced injuries, if possible.); Ma\ v. 
Portland Jeep. Inc., 509 P.2d 24, 26-27 (Or. 1973) (May predates the Huddell-Mitchell controversy; however, 
in allowing plaintiff to reach the trier of fact with an increased harm claim, the court said:There is no way of 
determining, of course, what the exact extent of plaintiffs injuries would have been had the roll bar not col-
lapsed. However, we allow juries to make somewhat similar inexact determinations such as the extent of pain 
and suffering and its value in money. We do because we believe such pain and suffering should be compens-
able, and there is no way of determining its extent and value other than to allow the jury to use its best judg-
ment. The only alternative in this case is to say that plaintiff probably was additionally injured by the collapse 
of the bar, but that because we cannot determine exactly what his injuries would have been if it had not col-
lapsed, he cannot recover at all. This is not an acceptable alternative....). 
It is likely that if apportionment is not possible, the Oregon court would reject Huddell. 
Mclnnis \ . A M.F. Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 249 (1st Cir.1985) (applying Rhode Island law), is an enhanced injury 
case that deals with the admissibility of a release from the tortfeasor who caused the accident in the case against 
the product manufacturer who was alleged to be responsible for the increased harm. Rule 408 of the Federal 
Rules prohibits the introduction of the release when used to prove "liability for or the invalidity of the claim." 
The defendant-manufacturer that was defending against the enhanced injury claim argued that "because there 
were two separate accidents involved in the case—the collision with the ... car and the crashing of the motor-
cycle—each party is liable only for the alleged divisible portion of the plaintiffs injury that their respective acts 
immediately caused." 765 F.2d at 249. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court said that under Rhode Is-
land law "the parties are both jointly and severally liable if they are both the legal cause of the harm that cannot 
be apportioned, whether the conduct is concurring or consecutive." Id. (emphasis added). Engberg \. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D.I973), has been cited in support of the rule stated in Subsection (c). See, e.g., Pol-
ston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 659, n. 1 (Ga.1992). Engberg predates the Mitchell-
Huddell controversy and does not speak to the issue of burden of apportionment once increased harm has been 
established. The court merely pointed out that the expert testimony that supported a finding of increased harm 
was adequate and could not be disregarded merely because the defendant had suggested other causes for the in-
creased harm. 
See also Shipp \. General Motors Corp., 750 F2d 418 (5th Cir.1985) (applying Texas law); Blankenship \ . 
General Motors Corp., 406 S E.2d 781 (W.Va.1991); Sumnicht v. Tovota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 
2, 11 (Wis. 1984) ( "once the plaintiff has proven that the defect was a cause of his injuries, he need not prove 
what portion of indivisible harm is attributable solely to the manufacturer"). A Wisconsin court has specifically 
rejected Huddell. In Maskre\ \ . Volkswagenwerk, A G., 370 N.W.2d 815, 822 (Wis.Ct.App.1985), the court, re-
lying on Sumnicht, applied the rule stated in this Subsection: "The trial court properly placed the initial burden 
on Maskrey to prove that Szuta's negligence and VW's defective product were substantial factors in causing the 
harm for which he claimed damages. Once such evidence was adduced, the trial court also properly placed the 
burden on VW to apportion the damages." Fox \. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying 
Wyoming law); Chnsler Corp. v. Todorouch. 580 P.2d 1123 (W\0.1978); Hane\ b) Harvey \ . General Motors 
Corp., 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir.1989) (The holding of Todorovich clearly rejects Huddell. 580 P.2d at 1131. The 
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court said, "The [enhanced] injuries sustained by [the plaintiff] are incapable of any logical, reasonable, or prac 
tical division. Since the conduct of Chrysler and that of Rummell each constituted a legal cause of the injuries 
sustained by [the plaintiff], they stand jointly and severally liable for the ftill extent of his injuries." Id.). 
T he statement by the court in Harvey by Harvey v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d at 1349, that "[u]nder 
Wyoming law, an enhancement instruction should not even be given unless the injuries are capable of logical, 
reasonable, or practical division" cannot be read to contradict the holding of Todorovich. The court seems to be 
saying that apportionment cannot be attempted unless there is adequate evidence to support it. The plaintiff ap-
parently based his claim on the hypothesis that the harm he suffered was divisible and was ultimately unable to 
establish what kind of harm he would have suffered had the auto design not been defective. Furthermore, there is 
a very real question whether there was any enhancement whatsoever. Admittedly, the question how a finding of 
no damages by the jury can be reconciled with the finding that the design defect was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs injuries is difficult. Nonetheless, Harvey cannot be read flatly to contradict the direct holding of To-
dorovich, which is a clear pronouncement by the Wyoming Supreme' Court of governing law within the state. 
The statement in Harvey that the court reads its opinion in Fox v. Ford Motor Co. in a "different light" than 
did the Fifth Circuit in Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985), is somewhat enigmatic. As 
noted earlier, the more pressing question is Todorovich, not Fox, since the former is the last word from the 
Wyoming Supreme Court. 
In addition to direct authority supporting the rule stated in this subsection, there is authority in some jurisdic-
tions dealing with successive collisions in which the courts hold the second tortfeasor who causes increased 
harm jointly and severally liable. See, e.g., Woodward v. Blythe, 462 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Ark. 1971) ("[W]here the 
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently of 
each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is im-
possible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury 
..." quoting 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, § 257); Romero v. Parker, 619 P.2d 89 (Colo.Ct.App. 1980) (in personal in-
jury action arising out of successive automobile collisions, the party who negligently caused the second collision 
is liable for entire award to injured person if the negligence of each defendant proximately caused injury to the 
plaintiff and the injuries cannot be apportioned). 
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions courts have taken positions with regard to the burden of proof issue that 
militate strongly in favor of the majority view. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 
1979) and Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.1978). Both Beck and Barker take the position that, once 
plaintiff proves that a product design proximately caused the plaintiffs injury, the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant to prove that the product met risk-utility norms. If the court is willing to accomplish burden shifting 
on the basic issue of defect, it is unlikely that, if the plaintiff proves a causal relationship between defect and en-
hanced injury, the court would not shift the burden of apportioning damages to the defendant. 
Two California intermediate appellate court cases tend to support the proposition that California would follow 
the rule stated in Subsection (c). See McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co.. 188 Cai.Rptr. 542 (Cal.Ct.App. 1983) 
(discussion of burden of proof in airplane crashworthiness case); Doupnik v. General Motors Corp., 275 
Cai.Rptr. 715. 719 (Cal.Ct.App. 1990). The court held that as long as the defect is a substantial factor in bringing 
about the enhanced injury, liability attaches. The case does not specifically address the shifting burden of proof 
issue, but the inference is strong that a plaintiff who establishes enhancement has fulfilled his burden of proof. 
Recently, the Georgia high court in Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc. 423 S.E.2d 659. 661 n. 1 
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(Ga. 1992), cited Doupnik as authority for the proposition that once the plaintiff establishes enhancement the bur-
den of apportionment shifts to the defendant. 
The Huddell approach. Only six states are clearly in the Huddell camp: Michigan, New Mexico, New York, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. A recent Iowa opinion follows the formal structure of Huddell, but 
one may reasonably doubt whether, if forced to make a choice, the Iowa court would follow Huddell. 
For cases supporting the minority position, see Sumner \. General Motors Corp., 538 N.W.2d 112 
(Mich.Ct.App. 1995); Huddell \ . Le\in, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976) (applying New Jersey law) (See discussion 
supra as to whether Huddell is still good authority in New Jersey); Duran \ . General Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779 
(N.M.Ct.App.1983), overruled on other grounds by Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M.1995); 
Caiazzo v. Volksv\agen\\erk, A.G.. 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying New York law; cited with approval in 
Held v. Ball, 507 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y.App.Div.1986); Garcia v. Rivera, 553 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y.App.Dh .1990), 
appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 980, 566 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991)); Craigie \ . General Motors Corp., 740 F.Supp. 353 
(E.D.Pa 1990); Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 644 A.2d 1213 (Pa.Super.Ct.1994); Stonehocker v. General Motors 
Corp.. 587 F.2d 151. 157 (4ih Cir. 1978) (applying South Carolina law); Chretien v. General Motors Corp., 959 
F.2d 231 (4th Cir 1992) (unpublished disposition). Applying Virginia law in Chretien, the court held that expert 
testimony that the plaintiffs injuries were enhanced by defect was not sufficient and that the plaintiff had the 
burden of proving the extent of the injuries. The court cited Huddell in support of this proposition. 
Thus, not only does the weight of the authority support the rule stated in § 16(c), but it also reflects the more 
recent developments. It is significant that most of the authority cited as supporting the position that the plaintiff 
has the burden of establishing the extent of the enhanced injury damages is from older cases. See, e.g., Werni-
mont v. International Han ester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa.Ct.App.1981). Wernimont is sometimes cited in 
support of the Huddell position. The court does cite Huddell for the elements of the crashworthiness cause of ac-
tion. However, as to whether the burden should shift to the defendant once the plaintiff has established some en-
hancement, the court is silent. In fact, the court notes that the Iowa Supreme Court has yet to address the prob-
lem. 309N.W.2dat 140 n.2. 
The most recent Iowa Supreme Court cases dealing with crashworthiness, Hillrichs \ . A\co Corp., 478 
N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1991), and Reed \. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992), do not confront the question 
directly. In Hillrichs, the court found that there was adequate evidence from which a jury could calculate the ex-
tent of the enhanced injury. The court did, however, say that "Damages, may be awarded, ... when the only dis-
pute is the amount of damages and the evidence affords a reasonable basis for estimating the loss." 478 N.W.2d 
at 75. In Reed, the court found that some reasonable estimation of add-on damages was, in fact, possible. The 
court said, "[wjhere some damages appear, recovery should not be denied merely because of difficulty in fixing 
an exact amount." 494 N W.2d at 228. One cannot be certain whether, if the Iowa court were faced with a case 
in which apportionment could not be reasonably determined, even by a relaxed standard of proof, the court 
would deny recovery. The language of Hillrichs would seem to imply that some reasonable apportionment is ne-
cessary. However, the Iowa court appears determined not to turn a plaintiff away because of the difficulties in 
proving the extent of the increased harm. 
One final point concerning the sources of authority on the issue of increased harm. Much of the authority 
stems from federal courts making Erie guesses about how state courts would hold. However, of the state courts 
that have spoken, the following states have taken a position consistent with the rule stated in § 16(c): Alabama 
(1985), Arizona (1991) (intermediate appellate court, and review denied by supreme court), Georgia (1992), 
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Idaho (1984), Illinois (1993) (intermediate appellate court), Maryland (1988), Missouri (1990) (intermediate ap-
pellate court), Nebraska (1994), Ohio (1990), Oklahoma (1984), West Virginia (1991), Wisconsin (1984), and 
Wyoming (1978). Only three states that have spoken support the rule that a plaintiff who is unable to establish 
the extent of apportionment fails to make out a cause of action: Michigan (1995) (intermediate appellate court), 
New Mexico (1983), and New York (1986), intermediate appellate court, and (1990) (intermediate appellate 
court) 
The Legal Commentators—Some Reflections 
An earl) law review Note was influential in the development of the Fox-Mitchell position Sej Note, Appor-
tionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 Va. L. Rev, 475 (1977). In general, the w riters contin-
ue to support the rule as stated in this Section. See, e.g., Beck, Enhanced Injury: A Direction for Washington, 61 
Wash. L. Rev. 571 {1986); Tietz, Bushman and Podraza, Crash worthiness and Erie: Determining Slate Law Re 
garding the Burden o( Proving and Apportioning Damages, 62 Temp L.Rev. 587 (1989). 
The Huddell view, however, has its supporters. See, e.g., Hoeing, Resolution of "Crashworthiness" Design 
Claims, 55 St. Johns L. Rev. 633, 699-706 (1981); Levenstam and Lapp, Plaintiff's Burden of Proving Enhanced 
Injun in Crashvvorthiness Cases: A Clash Worth) n\ Anal)sis, 38 De Paul L. Rev. 55 (1989); Shad, Warren v. 
Colombo; North Carolina Recognizes Claim lor Enhanced Injun, 68 N.C, L. Rev. 1330 (1990). 
In formulating the rule stated in § 16(c), careful consideration was given to the view of those who support the 
lluddell position. Two points are worthy of special consideration. First, the cases that have specifically confron-
ted the burden of proof problem strongly support the position taken in § 16(c). There is considerable language in 
man) of the decisions that a defendant in a crashvvorthiness case is only liable for the increased harm caused by 
the inadequate design that made it non-crashworthy As a general proposition, these statements are true and fully 
consistent with the rule set forth in § 16(c). For the most part, those cases do not address the problem oi u hat a 
court should do when a plaintiff establishes that the inadequate design was responsible for some increase in 
harm but cannot establish v\ ith any specificity the amount of the increase 
Second, several commentators argue that, by absolving the plaintiff of the responsibility for proving the de-
gree of increase in harm, no basis exists for determining that an increase in harm has occurred since in a 
second-collision case proof of causation and proof of increased harm are one and the same. They also argue 
that reliance on Restatement, Second, Torts § 433B(2) is erroneous because that section deals with apportion-
ment of harm among defendants. The standards as set forth in §§ 2 and 16, however, demand that the plaintiff 
establish that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted and that failure to adopt such a safer 
design was a substantial factor in causing increased harm. Furthermore, the position taken herein is fully con-
sistent with that set forth in § 433(B)(2). An excellent discussion of this point is found in Tietz, Bushman and 
Podraza, Crashvvorthiness and Erie, supra. 62 Temp. L. Rev. at 619 n.270. The authors set forth Illustration 8 
of § 43oB(2) and then analyze it in relation to Huddell:... Two automobiles negligently driven by A and B col-
lide, and in the collision C, a passenger in A's car, suffers an injur) to his right shoulder. Almost immediately 
afterward a car negligently driven by D drives into the wreckage, and in this second collision C's shouldci is 
further injured. As a result of one injury or the other, or both, C's arm becomes paralyzed. The burden is upon 
D to prove that the injury inflicted by him did not cause the paralysis.... § 433B Comment d, Illustration 8.If 
one superimposes the Huddell court's reasoning on the above scenario, it is easily discernible that the Huddell 
court's conclusion that the plaintiff must prove the extent of injur) caused b> the manufacturer's defective 
product in the "second collision" is in direct conflict with the Restatement. See HuddelL 537 F.2d at 737-38 
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(plaintiff must establish extent of enhanced injuries attributable to defective design). For clarity, assume that 
A and C represent Dr. Huddell; B represents Levin; and D represents General Motors' defective head restraint 
causing some injury in the second collision. The Huddell court reasoned that B, who set this above scenario 
into motion, is responsible for all the resulting harm to A/C, including the harm subsequently caused by D's 
conduct. The Restatement would agree with the Huddell court's conclusion as to B's liability. See Restatement, 
Second, of Torts § 433A Comment c, [Illustration 2 (successive injuries). The Huddell court also concluded 
that D's liability for A/C's aggregate harm would be for that amount over and above that caused by B's con-
duct. The Restatement would also agree with this premise, as a general rule....The Restatement and the Hud-
dell decision substantially diverge, however, on the issue of which party in the action commenced by A/C 
against B and D would have to prove the extent of A/C's harm caused by B's and D's conduct. Huddell places 
this burden on A/C, the injured plaintiff. See HuddelL 537 F.2d at 737-38 (plaintiffs burden of proof). The 
Restatement, however, follows traditional principles of apportionment by placing the burden of apportioning 
A/C's harm on D, the tortfeasor who is graced theoretically with limited liability, reasoning that it is unfair to 
permit a "proved wrongdoer who has in fact caused harm to the plaintiff to escape liability merely because the 
harm which he has inflicted has combined with similar harm inflicted by other wrongdoers, and the nature of 
the harm itself has made it necessary that evidence be produced before it can be apportioned." Restatement, 
Second, of Torts § 433B comment d (1965). 
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue find the analogy compelling. The Reporters agree. 
Comment e. Joint and several liability for increased harm. A plethora of authorities support § 16(d). See, e.g., 
Mitchell \ . Volkswagemverk, A.G.. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir.1982) (applying Michigan law); General Motors 
Corp. \. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176 (Ala.1985), overruled on other grounds by Schwartz \ . Voho North Am. 
Corp.. 554 So.2d 927 (Ala. 1989); McDowell v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., USA, 799 S.W.2d 854 
(Mo.Ct.App. 1990); Oakes \ . General Motors Corp., 628 N.E.2d 341 (Ul.App.Ct.1993). 
Comment/. Plaintiff fault in cases of increased harm. 
The issue of reduction of damages for a plaintiffs negligent failure to wear a seat belt is covered by statute in 
most jurisdictions. The statutes break down into four categories: 
(1) Failure to wear a seat belt may not be used to mitigate damages. Illinois specifically provides that "failure 
to wear a seat belt shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not limit the liability of an insurer, and 
shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of ... operation of a motor vehicle." 625 111. Comp. Stat. 
§ 5/13-603.1 (1996). Similar statutes have been enacted in Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, 
Kentucky, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. 
(2) Failure to wear a seat belt may be used to mitigate damages. The New York statute provides that failure to 
wear a seat belt may be introduced into evidence in mitigation of damages. N.Y, Veh. & Traf. Law 1229-c 
(McKinney 1991). Similar statutes have been enacted in Arkansas, California. Colorado, Florida, Indiana, and 
Tennessee. In California, while non-use of a safety belt is inadmissible as negligence per se, the statute does not 
preclude a jury's consideration of a failure to ensure passengers are fastened in seat belts in determining the reas-
onableness of the conduct in question. In Colorado, mitigation is limited to awards for pain and suffering and is 
not used to limit recovery of economic loss and medical payments. In Florida, mitigation is not allowed but non-
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use of a seat belt is admissible as evidence of comparative negligence. 
(3) Mitigation is permitted, with a cap on reduction. Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wis-
consin allow for reduction in damages based on the failure to wear a seat belt, but cap the reduction 
(4) Issue of mitigation is left to the developing case law. The New Jersey and Hawaii statutes appear to punt 
the question of mitigation of damages for failure to wear a seat belt over to the courts since they provide that 
their respective seat-belt laws shall not be deemed "to change existing laws, rules, or procedures pertaining to a 
trial of a civil action for damages or personal in)\iries " N I, Stat Ann, § 39:3-76.2 (West Supp. 1988); Ilaw, 
Rev. Stat. § 29.1-11.6(1985"). 
See generally Victor H. Schwartz, Comparuinc .Vgjgch. '-.-•;• •* • • -.esi omparative 
Negligence: Law and Practice § 4.40(1) (rep. vol. 1996). 
In the absence of a statute, Restatement Third, "I oils: Apportionment of Liability § 3, Proposed Final Draft 
(1998) (Illustration 3) takes the position that failure to wear a seat belt is relevant in determining whether the 
plaintiff was negligent and, if so, the extent to which damages should be reduced under the principle of compar-
ative responsibility, 
The more difficult issue is whether the plaintiffs negligent conduct leading to the underlying accident 
should be a subject of comparative fault in determining liability for increased harm. The courts are sharply 
split on this issue. Several courts have taken the position that a plaintiffs negligent conduct should not be con-
sidered. See, e.g., Cota v. Harley Davidson, 684 P.2d 888 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1984) (holding evidence of plaintiffs 
intoxication at the time of accident is irrelevant aiid inadmissible in an enhanced-injury case); Andrews v. 
Harley Davidson, Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1990)-.Contributory negligence is not a defense in a strict liabil-
ity case where the issue is whether the design of a vehicle is crashworthy A major policy behind holding 
manufacturers strictly liable for failing to produce crashworthy vehicles is to encourage them to do all they 
reasonably can do to design a vehicle which will protect a driver in an accident. Hence, the jury in such a case 
should focus on whether the manufacturer produced a defective product, not on the consumer's negligence. 
See also Free v. Brunswick Corp., 983 F.2d 863, 866 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Missouri law) (" we 
conclude that evidence of intoxication is irrelevant in a strict tort liability action for enhancement of injury,"); 
Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C. I.. Rev. 643, 673-74 (1.984):In enhanced 
injury cases, unlike ordinary products liability cases, a claimant's fault in causing the accident is not a basis 
for reducing his recovery. Undoubtedly, many accidents are the result of the injured party's negligence. Never-
theless, a manufacturer's duty is that of minimizing the injurious effects of contact however caused. The inev-
itability of both operator negligence and injury-producing contact was a primary reason for the judicial recog-
nition of the duty to protect against enhanced injuries. The cause of the contact has no bearing on the issue of 
whether an object's response to the contact was a reasonable one. The trier of fact's analysis must be limited to 
the nature and severity of the contact and the object's response. A negligent operator is entitled to the same 
protection against unnecessary injury as the careful iiser of the same product is entitled. 
A majority of courts, however, allows the introduction of plaintiffs conduct as comparative fault in a craslI-
worthiness context. See, e.g., Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying Arkansas law; 
comparative fault applies in a crashworthiness case and jury properly considered the plaintiffs intoxication in 
assessing fault); Daly v, General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162. 1 174 (Cal.1978) (Evidence of plaintiffs intoxic-
ation and failure to use seat belts and door locks was admissible on the issue of comparative fault. T he case was 
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reversed because the trial judge did not limit the admissibility to comparative fault, but also allowed the evid-
ence in as grounds for totally barring the plaintiffs claim because of product misuse.); see also Dahl v. Ba>-
erische Motorcn Werke. 748 P.2d 77 (Or. 1987) (all of plaintiffs conduct that contributed to injuries, including 
failure to wear a seat belt, may be considered in a comparative fault reduction); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 506 F.Supp. 1093 (D.Mont. 1981) (applying Montana law) (negligent conduct of pilot must be 
considered in a crashworthiness claim against the aircraft manufacturer); Hinkamp \. American Motors Corp.. 
735 F.Supp. 176 (E.D.N.C.1989) (plaintiffs intoxication is contributory negligence which may be taken into ac-
count in a crashworthiness case); Da\ \. General Motors Corp.. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D.1984). In Day, plaintiffs 
fault in causing the injury and plaintiffs fault in enhancing the injury were included in assessing the percentage 
of fault attributed to the plaintiff. Thus, plaintiffs negligence in falling asleep at the wheel and plaintiffs failure 
to wear a seat and harness belt were both considered in reducing plaintiffs recovery under comparative fault. 
See also Duncan \ . Cessna Aircraft Co , 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) (in an airplane crashworthiness case com-
parative fault principles apply against the negligent pilot of the airplane); Har\e\ v. General Motors Corp., 873 
F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Wyoming law, in a crashworthiness case, evidence of plaintiffs drinking 
and reckless driving is relevant as to the reasonableness of plaintiffs conduct). 
Research References 
1. Digest System Key Numbers 
Negligence € ^ > 97-101. 
2. A.L.R. Annotations 
Products liability: sufficiency of proof of injuries resulting from "second collision". 9 ALR4th 494. 
Products liability: vehicular bumpers. 5 ALR4th 483. 
Products liability: defeeth c \ ehicular w indow s. 3 ALR4ih 489. 
Products liability: defective \ehicular gasoline tanks. 96 ALR3d 265. 
Liability of manufacturer, seller, or distributor of motor vehicle for defect which merely enhances injury from 
accident others ise caused. 42 ALR3d 560. 
Case Citations 
Case Citations Jul\ 1984 through June 2003 
- June 2007Case Citations July 2003 - June 2007 
- April 2008Case Citations Jul\ 2007 - April 2008 
Case Citations Jul) 1984 through June 2003: 
C.A.I, 1999. Com. (d) cit. in ftn. After their van was involved in collision with oncoming car, injured pas-
sengers and estate of deceased passenger brought products-liability action against van manufacturer, alleging 
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"crashworthiness" claim for enhanced injuries attributable to van's defective design. The district court dis-
missed in part, and jury returned verdicts for defendants on remaining claims. This court affirmed in part and 
certified to the New Hampshire Supreme Court the question of whether plaintiffs bore the burden of demon-
strating the specific nature and extent of injuries attributable to defendant, or whether the burden of apportion-
ment fell on defendant once plaintiffs had proved causation. Trull \. Volkswagen of America. Inc., 187 F.3d 
88, 100. 
C.A.7, 1994. Cit. in sup. (citing § 6, T.D. No. 1, 1994, which is now § 16). Automobile driver who became 
a quadriplegic when she was thrown from her vehicle during a rollover sued car manufacturer on products-liab-
ility theory. Plaintiff alleged that her injuries were enhanced when her defectively designed safety belt 
slackened during the accident. She also argued that the entire car was defectively designed in that it failed to 
prevent her ejection. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and this reversed 
and remanded. It held that material factual issues remained as to whether plaintiff was even wearing her safety 
belt at the time of the rollover but, as to her second contention, summary judgment was appropriate as she 
presented no evidence of a feasible and affordable design alternative to the one that was in place. Pries v. 
Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 31 F.3d 543, 544. 
M.D.Pa.2002. Quot. in sup. In automobile occupants' personal-injury case involving a crashworthiness 
claim against automobile manufacturer, plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to adopt as the burden of proof for a 
crashvvorthiness case the approach set forth by the state intermediate appellate court. Granting the motion, this 
court held, inter alia, that it would adopt the state-court approach, which required a plaintiff to prove only that 
a defect was a substantial factor in producing damages over and above those that were probably caused as a 
result of the original impact or collision, as the law applicable to the instant case. Carrasquilla v. Mazda Motor 
Corp., 197F.Supp.2d 169. 175. 
Alaska, 1998. Cit. in disc, com. (a) quot. in ftn., com. (d) cit. in disc, and ftn. (Proposed Final Draft, April 
1, 1997). After suffering severe injuries in a car accident, a passenger sued the car manufacturer in strict 
products liability for designing a defective seat-restraint system. Trial court entered judgment on jury verdict 
for plaintiff. This court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding, inter alia, that the jury in-
struction properly placed the burden of apportioning injury on defendant. It would be unfair to require a 
plaintiff who had already proved that a defect was a substantial factor in causing his or her injuries to try an-
other case based upon what might have happened absent the defect. General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 
P.2d 1209. 1212, 1219, 1220. 
Del.Super.1997. Com. (f) cit. and quot. in disc, and cit. in ftn. (citing § 6, T.D. No. 1, 1994, and § 11, T.D. 
No. 2, 1995 (erron. cit. as § 6, T.D. No. 6, 1994); these sections are now § 16). A driver sustained injuries to 
his fingers in a car accident when a defect in the car's air-bag-module design caused his fingers to be crushed 
against the steering wheel when the air bag deflated. The driver sued the car manufacturer for products liabil-
ity. This court denied the driver's motion in limine to exclude testimony of the manufacturer's expert regarding 
the driver's negligence in causing the accident. The court held, inter alia, that the driver's comparative negli-
gence in causing the initial injury is an affirmative defense to a products-liability action for enhanced injuries 
in a crashworthiness case. It stated that it would be difficult and confusing to instruct a jury that it should not 
consider the cause of the collision but only the cause of the enhanced injuries. Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 
699 A.2cl 339, 344. 
Mass.App.1998. Cit. in ftn., com. (a) quot. in disc, and ftn., com. (b) quot. in disc, Rptr's Note to com. (d) 
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quot. in disc, illus. 6 cit. in ftn. After a driver and her infant son were injured in a car accident, the driver's 
family sued the car manufacturer and the dealer for breach of warranty, negligence, deceit, products liability, 
and violation of the state consumer protection statute. The jury awarded plaintiffs damages on the warranty 
and negligence claims, but the trial court granted the manufacturer's motion for judgment n.o.v. This court af-
firmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court adequately instructed the jury as to causation in a crashworthi-
ness case. Lall\ \ . Volkswagen Akticngesellschaft, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 317, 698 N.E.2d 28, 33. 37-39. 
N.H.2000. Com. (d) cit. in disc, Rptr's Note cit. in disc. After a car accident in which a child died and his 
family suffered severe brain injuries, the family members and the child's estate sued the car manufacturer for 
negligence and strict liability, alleging that the car was defective and was not crashworthy. Federal district 
court granted defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs' breach-of-warranty claim. Answering a certified 
question from the federal circuit court of appeals, this court held that a manufacturer could be held liable for 
enhanced injuries arising from a defective design, and it concluded that the manufacturer bore the burden of 
apportioning the injuries caused by the car's defect once the plaintiffs proved causation. Trull \. Volkswagen 
of America, Inc.. 761 A.2d 477, 481, 482. 
N.J.Super.1998. Cit. generally in disc, cit. generally in ftns., subsecs. (b) and (c) quot. in disc, subsec (c) 
cit. in ftn., com. (d) cit. in disc, com. (f) quot. in ftn., Rptr's Note quot. in disc, and quot. in ftn. (Prop. Final 
Draft, 1997). Motorist was severely injured when his car collided with a school van and the car's T-bar roof 
collapsed; he brought defective-design products-liability action against the manufacturer of his vehicle. The 
trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding plaintiff $25 million in damages. Affirming in part, re-
versing in part, and remanding, this court held that, while speed was not relevant to the issue of design defect, 
it was admissible for purposes of showing causation; that plaintiff could establish his prima facie case without 
producing a prototype incorporating his proposed alternative roof designs; that the lower court committed 
harmless error in failing to place the burden of proving allocation of injuries on defendant; and that defendant 
was not entitled to a credit of $799,000, the amount plaintiff received in settlement of his claim against van 
driver. Green \. General Motors Corp., 310 N.J.Super. 507. 709 A.2d 205, 215-216. 223, 224. 
N.J.Super.2000. Subsecs. (b) and (c) quot. in sup. and adopted, com. (a) cit. in disc, and in sup., com. (c) 
quot. in sup., com. (f) quot. in disc, Rptr's Note, corns, (d) and (f) cit. in disc. Widow of driver killed in auto-
mobile collision brought wrongful-death action against manufacturer of automobile, claiming that driver's-side 
door was defectively manufactured and that the defect resulted in vehicle not being "crashworthy." The trial 
court entered judgment on jury verdict finding that 80% of decedent's injuries were caused by accident and 
only 20% were caused by defective welds in car door. Reversing and remanding for a new trial, this court 
held, inter alia, that the trial court erred by placing the burden of apportionment of crashworthy damages on 
plaintiff instead of on defendant, that death was capable of apportionment as to causation, and that the jury 
was not instructed properly on the issue of concurrent causation. Poliseno \ . General Motors Corp.. 328 
N.J.Super. 41, 52, 53, 55, 56. 58, 60, 744 A.2d 679. 685-689. 
N.M.App.1999. Com. (f) cit. in ftn. Mini van occupants brought crashworthiness case against vehicle manu-
facturer, among others, alleging that defective rear-door latch caused them to be thrown from minivan and suf-
fer enhanced injuries. The trial court entered judgment for defendant. Affirming, this court held, inter alia, 
that, owing to jury's finding that defective latch did not proximately cause any of plaintiffs' injuries, concur-
rent-tortfeasor instruction that erroneously allowed jury to compare driver's fault in causing accident with de-
fendant's fault for enhanced injury as part of process of apportioning liability was harmless error. Norwest 
Bank New Mexico, N.A. \ . Chnsler Corp., 127 N.M. 397, 981 P.2d 1215, 1220. 
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N.Y.Sup.Ct.App.Div.2001. Quot. in sup. After snowplow attachment cylinder detached from truck and 
struck child passenger in a car driven by child's father, father sued owner and driver of truck and manufactur-
ers of snowplow attachment. Jury found manufacturers 5% responsible for injury and child's father 95% re-
sponsible and awarded plaintiff damages. Trial court reduced award, holding that manufacturer was not jointly 
and severally liable for entire damage award, but was severally liable for only 5% of award. This court re-
versed and remanded, concluding that, although jury's finding that design defect caused or contributed to 
child's injuries necessarily required a finding as to specific injuries caused or enhanced, the verdict sheet 
provided no means for reporting that finding to the court. That deficiency precluded court from ascertaining 
whether jury found that snowplow attachment's negligent design enhanced head injuries, leg injuries, or both. 
Said v. Assaad, 289 A.D.2d 924. 735 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268. 
Pa.Super.2001. Quot. in sup. Motorist and her husband sued car manufacturer for products liability, al-
leging that car's pillar post was unreasonably dangerous because its base welds failed, causing it to detach at 
the base and strike motorist's head after car spun out of control on icy road. Trial court entered judgment on 
jury verdict, which found that car was defective, but defect was not a substantial factor in causing motorist's 
injuries. This court vacated and remanded, holding that trial court erred in instructing jury that plaintiffs bore 
the burden of quantifying the extent of enhanced injuries caused by the alleged defect in car. Plaintiffs had to 
prove only that defect was a substantial factor in producing damages over and above those that were probably 
caused due to the original impact. Stecher \. Ford Motor Co., 779 A.2d 49i, 495-496. 
Tex.App.2001. Cit. in sup., com. (b) quot. in sup. Estate of driver who died from complications of quadri-
plegia following car accident sued car manufacturer for products liability. Trial court entered judgment on 
jury verdict for estate. This court reversed and rendered take-nothing judgment for manufacturer, holding that 
there was no evidence of defect or causation. The fact that plaintiff's alternative design might have avoided 
plaintiffs flexion/compression injury did not prove that manufacturer's belting was defective. There was no 
evidence that plaintiffs alternative webbing or other energy-absorbing ideas were as safe as manufacturer's 
webbing in terms of protecting greatest number of drivers from greatest risk, that of driver impacting steering 
wheel. There was also insufficient evidence to support jury's finding on causation. General Motors Corp. v. 
Harper, 61 S.W.3d 118. 125, 131. 
- June 2007:Case Citations July 2003 - June 2007: 
C.A.3, 2004. Com. (b) cit. in disc. Corporation sued insurers, seeking coverage for costs and expenses in-
curred in remediating its computer systems to avoid Year 2000 (Y2K) related date-recognition problems. Dis-
trict court granted insurers summary judgment. This court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that coverage for 
plaintiffs remediation measures was barred by the plain language of both the defective-design and inherent-
vice exclusions. The court stated that, while industry standards and the existence of alternative feasible 
designs might be relevant standards in determining whether there was a design defect for the purpose of tort 
liability, the fact that the two-date designation system was designed in accordance with "best practice" or in-
dustry standard did not mean that plaintiffs insurance policy provided coverage for necessary changes and up-
grades to that system. GTE Corp. \ . Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 598, 609. 
D.N.M.2005. Com. (f) cit. in case cit. in disc. Severely burned operator of asphalt distributor brought strict 
products-liability claim against the machine's manufacturer, alleging design defects in the distributor. Grant-
ing in part defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court, after reviewing numerous citations 
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by New Mexico courts to the Restatement Third of Torts, concluded, inter alia, that New Mexico, in accord-
ance with the Third Restatement, required that plaintiff prove the existence of an alternative design to impose 
liability for a design defect. Morales \. E.D. Etnxre & Co., 382 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1283. 
S.D.N.Y.2005. Com. (a) cit. in ftn. Several municipalities and water suppliers brought consolidated multi-
district action against gasoline producers, seeking relief from actual or possible groundwater contamination 
from producers' use of the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). Manufacturers moved to dis-
miss several complaints. The court held, inter alia, that New Hampshire plaintiffs adequately stated a cause of 
action for collective liability, given that courts in that state had placed the burden of disproving joint liability 
on defendants in vehicular crashworthiness cases involving indivisible injuries. By analogy then, New Hamp-
shire courts would probably apply theories of collective liability here, since plaintiffs could not prove which 
defendant produced the gasoline—a fungible product—that contaminated their groundwater supply. In re 
Methyl Tertiary Buhl Ether (MTBE) Products Liability Litigation, 379 F.Supp.2d 348, 414. 
D.S.C.2007. Subsec. (a) cit. in sup. Woodworker whose hand was seriously injured when it got caught in a 
wood grinder brought products-liability suit against grinder's manufacturer, alleging, among other things, that 
the grinder was defective because the remote control for the grinder did not have a red, mushroom-shaped 
emergency stop button, and there was no emergency stop button on the grinder within reach of the grinder's 
conveyor. This court denied defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that a fact issue exis-
ted as to causation. The court found that plaintiffs engineering expert's testimony, in conjunction with 
plaintiffs own testimony by way of affidavit, provided evidence that, while plaintiffs hand went all the way in-
to the machine very quickly and was immediately injured, he would have suffered a less severe injury had the 
alleged defects at issue not existed. Phillips v. MorbarL Inc., 481 F.Supp.2d 461, 464. 
NJ.Super.App.Div.2005. Subsecs. (b) and (c) adopted in case quot. in disc. Children who witnessed moth-
er's highway death after a stray tire crashed into their minivan, crushing minivan's windshield header down-
ward and fracturing mother's skull, brought crashworthiness products-liability action against minivan manu-
facturer and others. After a first trial in which the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs, the trial court granted 
manufacturer a new trial on damages only, and entered the second jury's lesser damages awards. This court re-
versed in part and remanded for a new trial on the issue of apportionment of fault, holding that the first trial 
court erred in declining to give an apportionment charge. The court reasoned that a fair and reasonable jury 
could have concluded that one or more of the settling defendants in the case bore at least some percentage of 
liability for mother's death, since the design defect in the minivan's windshield header did not cause the acci-
dent but increased the resulting harm, and a portion of the damages sought by plaintiffs arose from the occur-
rence of the accident itself. Bonszewski e\ rcl. Bonszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J.Super. 361, 381. 882 A.2d 
410,421-422. 
Pa.2005. Cit. in disc, cit. generally in disc, and in ftn., subsecs. (a) and (b) cit. in disc, subsec(d) quot. in 
disc, com. (a) cit. in ftn., com. (e) quot. in ftn., illus. 7 cit. in ftn. Estates of three family members killed when 
a tractor-trailer collided with their car sued tractor-trailer driver and others for negligence and car manufac-
turer under a crashworthiness theory of products liability. After a jury found that both drivers' negligence and 
defects in the car were substantial factors in causing the fatalities, the trial court ultimately entered judgment 
against defendants jointly and severally, and the court of appeals affirmed. Affirming, this court held that the 
trial court did not err in assessing liability jointly and severally; although crashworthiness theory established a 
basis to support liability for enhanced injury, it did not require manufacturer to have been the exclusive cause 
of such injury, nor did it diminish the causal link that existed between an initial collision and all resultant 
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harm. Harsh \ . Pctroll. 584 Pa. 606, 887 A.2d 209. 211,214-218. 
Pa.CmwIth.2003. Cit. in case cit. in sup., quot. in ftn. Estates of car passengers who died from smoke inhal-
ation and severe burns after their car was struck from behind by a tractor trailer and almost immediately en-
gulfed in flames sued car manufacturer and truck driver for negligence and strict liability. Trial court imposed 
damages between defendants for their respective liability in causing the deaths, holding that truck driver and 
his employers were jointly and severally liable with manufacturer for the full amount of the judgment. This 
court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court properly held that damages were not divisible, and that 
truck driver and his employers were joint tortfeasors with manufacturer. The harm caused by defendants was a 
single, indivisible harm, i.e., death, and both parties contributed to that harm. Harsh \ . Petrol 1, 840 A.2d 404. 
442. 
Pa.Cmwlth.2006. Cit. in ftn., com. (a) cit. in ftn. Driver of front-end loader sought damages for enhanced 
injuries in products-liability action against manufacturer of loader, alleging that the loader was defectively de-
signed and insufficiently crashworthy because it lacked, inter alia, a three-point seat belt for the operator's seat 
and padding for its rollover-protection system. The trial court entered the jury's unanimous verdict in favor of 
defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for a new trial. Affirming, this court held that there was no error in the 
trial court's conduct of the trial, despite an overabundance of issues raised by plaintiff. In making its decision, 
the court noted that, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not specifically adopted the crashworthi-
ness doctrine, it had abided its adoption by the intermediate appellate courts. Daddona v. Thind, 891 A.2d 
786, 797. 
- April 2008:Case Citations July 2007 - April 2008: 
Utah, 2007. Subsec. (a) cit. and quot. in sup., cit. in ftn., and adopted. Passenger who was ejected through a 
car window during a rollover accident brought products-liability claims against car manufacturer in federal 
court, alleging, among other things, that her injuries would have been less severe if the window had been 
made of laminated rather than tempered glass. The district court certified to this court the question of whether 
Utah recognized the "enhanced injury" theory of liability outlined in Restatement Third of Torts: Products 
Liability § 16(a). This court answered in the affirmative, but declined to address which party had the burden 
of proof with respect to the allocation of injuries resulting from the underlying accident and those resulting 
from the product defect, because that issue was not certified to it. Egbert v. Nissan North America, Inc.. 2007 
UT 64. 167 P.3d 1058, 1059, 1063. 
(1998) 
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